University of Vaasa - Vaasan yliopisto

Public Politics and Private Politics
710
Baron (2003) explained the change of NGOs’ strategy using the “Public Politics” and
“Private Politics”. The ‘Public Politics’ is a measure through which NGOs require
government to introduce new regulations, and the ‘Private Politics’ is one through
which NGOs try to directly affect decision making of companies. NGOs’ movements
can also be separated in the advocacy movement through which NGOs try to collect
and diffuse information of companies and the market-based movement through
which NGOs try to affect the marketing strategies of companies, typically boycotting
and anti-movements. Or the private politics can be understood as an adversarial
approach and a cooperative approach.
NGOs internationally shifted in 1990s from the public politics to the private politics,
from protest movements to cooperative movements. An NGO at first introduced
boycotting but it was costly. However, some activities aimed cooperation between
the company and the NGO were successful in reducing the information costs and
improving the relationship. Invention of the non-CFC refrigerator “green freeze” is a
successful example of such kind of cooperation. This kind of cooperation must
promote information exchange between the company and the NGO. The NGO can
learn the technology which the company has, and the company can use the liability
of the NGO. German consumers want the information about the environmental
effects of the company, but they want the credibility of such information to be
ensured by an independent organisation at the same time. Companies learned that
disclosure brings them market supremacy by using the trust of NGOs. An attitude
toward the environmental problems of Japanese companies shifted consciously from
reaction to regulations to strategic correspondence as managerial task.
Change of Relationship
Sometimes the relationship itself can change. In the case of Japan, an environmental
policy produced a new tension of government, companies and NGOs. As explained
above, a Japanese institution was very rigid in which the government, bureaucracy
and companies had a strong connection. The information which all stakeholders
needed was exchanged only within this circle. This relationship was based on
Japanese sectionalism, but an environmental policy did not belong to any sector. A
power game of government and companies occurred in this situation. After
researching about the environmental impact assessment law, Murai (2000) suggested
the change of the opportunity structure of a Japanese environmental policy was
drastic at that time. The Japanese environmental agency tried in 1997 to enact the
environmental impact assessment law again 9 . At that time the Ministry of
International Trade and Industry (MITI) and the Federation of Electric Power
Companies of Japan confronted for the intensity of the law. The environmental
Agency which has for a long time dealt with enactment of the law got favourable
reaction from other ministries. The MITI which wanted to keep its influence on the
9 the environmental agency has tried six times since 1975 to 1982 to enact the environmental impact
assessment law (Murai 2000)