CORRUPTION Syndromes of Corruption

The international setting 35
compare TI scores to non-GDP parts of the development index the
relationships are far weaker than those seen above. That, ultimately,
may reflect the trade-and-business issues raised by GDP figures and
informing the TI index. Understanding those processes, as well as untangling
the complex distribution of high-corruption cases, would seem to
require close examination of patterns of participation and institutions
within a framework that can make sense of a variety of contrasts and
variations.
Conclusion
Is the consensus view wrong, then? In many ways, no: there is little reason
to doubt that corruption harms development, feeds on (and reinforces)
institutional weakness and unfair political and economic advantages, and
creates further political and economic problems. But that view is
incomplete: while it is a powerful account at a high level of generality (as
in the statistical relationships between corruption perceptions and development
data) it does not tell us much about the underlying causes and
contrasting corruption problems found in diverse societies. The affluent
market democracies that serve as models for liberalization and reform
resemble each other in many ways; by contrast, there are many kinds of
authoritarian regimes, many roots of poverty, and many types of
institutional weakness. This poses the intriguing hypothesis that
corruption is not just a single problem but rather one that is embedded
in diverse contexts – and that where it is most serious its origins and
implications may vary the most.
In the remaining chapters of this book I offer the argument that we can
identify and compare major syndromes of corruption originating in
underlying patterns of political and economic participation – in the
ways people pursue, use, and exchange wealth and power – and in the
strength or weakness of the institutions that sustain and restrain those
diverse social activities. This approach offers not only a better understanding
of the contrasting ways the problem develops and functions in
real settings; it can also suggest countermeasures appropriate in differing
settings, and ways to avoid doing unintended damage through unwise
reforms. Such arguments require detailed comparisons of evidence on
participation and institutions, and that is the agenda in chapter 3.