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CORRUPTION Syndromes of Corruption

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196 <strong>Syndromes</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>Corruption</strong><br />

Tactics without strategy?<br />

This approach to reform <strong>of</strong>ten judges high-corruption countries mostly in<br />

terms <strong>of</strong> what they appear to lack when compared to affluent market<br />

democracies, rather than in terms <strong>of</strong> what forces actually are shaping their<br />

corruption problems. Reforms imported from those advanced societies<br />

<strong>of</strong>ten follow crime-prevention models in which punishments and (less<br />

frequently) positive incentives are aimed at specific kinds <strong>of</strong> individual<br />

behavior, or a transparency paradigm that relies upon news media, and<br />

citizens as voters or consumers, to avoid or penalize corruption through<br />

their own choices, regardless <strong>of</strong> whether people and the press are up to<br />

those tasks. There is nothing wrong with most such ideas, but much less<br />

attention is given to the systemic factors shaping and sustaining corruption<br />

or to the institutional and social foundations any reform model<br />

requires. The increasingly important role <strong>of</strong> civil society in most reform<br />

models is likewise shaped by the experiences <strong>of</strong> affluent market democracies,<br />

but in many other countries society is impoverished, fragmented,<br />

intimidated, and anything but civil.<br />

For those reasons anti-corruption measures effective in one context<br />

may be irrelevant or harmful in another. Launching competitive elections<br />

in Kenya and Indonesia before legitimate resources and an effective<br />

judiciary and party system were in place arguably made corruption<br />

worse. Privatizing the Russian economy in the absence <strong>of</strong> a supporting<br />

institutional framework, and in a political system <strong>of</strong> dubious capacity, not<br />

only led to more corruption but to particularly devastating forms <strong>of</strong> it.<br />

Even where the state has some credibility more extensive laws and larger<br />

penalties may merely drive ‘‘amateurs’’ out <strong>of</strong> the process and leave it to<br />

formidable ‘‘pr<strong>of</strong>essionals,’’ and may create new corruption opportunities<br />

for those charged with enforcement. At worst, a public push for reform<br />

can be a smokescreen for continued abuses. Indeed, when we look at<br />

corruption as a problem embedded in long-term development difficulties<br />

and imbalances the wonder is not that there is so much <strong>of</strong> it but rather that<br />

it has ever been brought under control. But that view may also hold<br />

important clues to success if we think <strong>of</strong> reform not as specific measures<br />

but as a basic development process in its own right.<br />

Systemic responses to systemic problems<br />

The understandable temptation is to bombard corruption with every<br />

good idea that comes to hand. ‘‘Toolkits’’ <strong>of</strong>fer a variety <strong>of</strong> ‘‘best practices’’,<br />

but how do those reforms succeed, or fail, in a given context, and<br />

when is a society prepared to implement them effectively? Reform

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