CORRUPTION Syndromes of Corruption

Elite Cartels 95
DC-led coalition that shared power and a pervasive spoils system.
A coalition party could lose a few parliamentary seats at the polls – though
in fact electoral results remained remarkably consistent through most of
the First Republic era – but still have a place at the trough (Calise, 1994;
Hine, 1995: 193; Buffachi and Burgess, 1998: 5, 11, 87–88; Colazingari
and Rose-Ackerman, 1998: 457–462; Della Porta and Vannucci, 1999,
2002; Della Porta, 2004). After the late 1940s the Communists (PCI)
were an ineffective opposition at the national level, but their presence,
along with anticipated US reaction should they win power, helped bind
the coalition together and enabled it to put pressure upon business contributors
(Rhodes, 1997: 66–72).
Extortion of business by party cashiers was common, though often
bribes and kickbacks were given as a matter of course. Some payments
were for specific benefits; more often they were informal ‘‘taxes’’ paid in
anticipation of the protection the parties could afford, be it against the
actions of the state or corrupt demands from competing politicians.
Kickbacks on construction contracts of 10 percent were a de facto standard.
Party leaders who brokered favorable decisions for businesses could
expect a substantial cut. In an ordinary year during the late 1980s the DC
took in around 60–65 billion Lire (approximately US$40 million), a
figure that rose to around 80–85 billion Lire in election years. Of that
total 16–17 billion Lire was illicit income, some of it from business
speculation but much of it from bribes (Colazingari and Rose-
Ackerman, 1998: 457–459). Corruption may have been made worse by
‘‘reforms’’ in 1974 that barred contributions from public corporations,
effectively compelling parties to seek out illegal contributions (Waters,
1994; Rhodes, 1997; for a dissent see Colazingari and Rose-Ackerman,
1998: 459).
Business politicians and their clients profited personally from corruption,
but through most of the First Republic corrupt revenues were used more to
cement party hegemonies and elite networks than for self-enrichment (Hine,
1995: 182). Proceeds were shared among the parties, and even at times with
the Communists, in order to buy cooperation; party shares of major construction
contracts were often negotiated in advance. Parties carved out
bailiwicks in the public, private, and Italy’s large parastatal sectors roughly
in proportion to their national power but also based on local and regional
power bases (Golden, 2003: 189–202; Della Porta, 2004). Through a
process of lottizzazione (‘‘allocation’’) jobs at many levels, including major
policy and management positions, were divided up among parties (Hine,
1995: 185; Bufacchi and Burgess, 1998:95).DellaPorta(2004) describes a
similar partitizzazione (partitioning) process for appointments in the public
bureaucracy that extended party-based clientelism.