CORRUPTION Syndromes of Corruption

From analysis to reform 189
In many ways expected contrasts did emerge. The Influence Market
group has corruption issues that inhibit political competition and undermine
the credibility and effectiveness of democratic processes, a fact that
one-dimensional corruption indices underemphasize. Connections
between wealth and power can be a systemic problem even when the
giving and getting are legal and publicly disclosed. More important,
however, is that Influence Market countries, while influential in shaping
international reform agendas, differ qualitatively from others. Elite Cartel
countries generally have institutions of only middling strength, and
behind a façade of political competition elite hegemony is the rule.
Parties colonize the bureaucracy, colluding to freeze out prospective
competitors. Oligarch and Clan countries have weaker institutions still;
much power resides in the hands of contending elites who are backed by
personal networks spanning politics and the economy, state domains and
private interests. So insecure is the situation that corruption is linked to
violence in ways that have few parallels in Elite Cartel cases and virtually
none in Influence Markets. Official Mogul cases, finally, stand influence
markets on their heads: official power, not wealth, drives most corrupt
activities, as officials reach out and plunder the economy; quid pro quo
exchanges occur but the biggest cases are little more than theft. The tax
and duty-avoidance schemes of China, the Philippine oligarchs whose
personal networks extend deep into the state and economy, and the
politician–chaebol alliances of Korea are not just ‘‘more corrupt’’ than
the political contribution scandals of Influence Market countries; they
embody different patterns of participation and institutions, and different
sorts of connections between wealth and power.
A focus on syndromes changes our view of regional issues. Speculation
abounds over contrasts between ‘‘Asian’’ and ‘‘African’’ corruption, particularly
given the widely divergent economic records of those regions.
African states do tend to cluster in the Official Moguls group, but
there are intriguing variations: Benin, for example, is an Oligarch and
Clan case while Botswana falls among the Elite Cartels. We should be
cautious in generalizing about ‘‘African corruption,’’ and at the very least
must consider influences beyond the geographical and (often more
assumed than demonstrated) cultural commonalities. Similarly, Asian
states are included in all four groups, with Japan, Korea, the
Philippines, and Indonesia illustrating major contrasts. It is difficult to
claim that fast-growing Asian countries hit upon some variety of beneficial
corruption for a thirty-year period when corruption problems differ
as they do. We might better look at how their economies did or did not
withstand its effects for a time – particularly, via policy and intra-elite
political processes – and how those connections changed over time.