CORRUPTION Syndromes of Corruption

Official Moguls 175
Kenya, in the early 1990s, came at a time when cuts in development aid
and international scrutiny of political repression were depriving Moi and
KANU of many of the traditional tactics and more modest benefits that
had long sustained their patronage systems. While Moi faced only a weak
and divided opposition, he took no chances; in the face of increased
uncertainty created by competitive elections land and other major assets
became extremely attractive political rewards. Klopp (2000) argues that
through land seizures and other high-level theft Moi kept the patronage
system going and, in effect, shifted some of the costs of aid cuts on to
society at large. That international anti-corruption scrutiny tended to
focus on high-level bribery and overlook this particular form of patronage
only made it more useful. Human Rights Watch (2002: 7) concluded that
multiparty elections and international pressure for reform made for more
corruption, of more rapacious sorts, during the 1990s as Moi fought to
defend his power by any means at hand.
Liberalized state, vulnerable society
Because economic and limited political liberalization had proceeded
without necessary institution- and civil-society building, victims and
opponents of land-grabbing had few choices. They could get little or no
help from the courts or police. Voting for the opposition was likely to have
little effect; indeed, to the extent that stronger opposition gave Moi a
sense of insecurity it might intensify his abuses. Journalists and the press
could report the stories, but civil society in general, and institutions of
vertical and horizontal accountability, were too weak to take on the
Moguls. Protests against land-grabbing did take place, and may have
helped build some strength in civil society for the longer term: new
organizations were formed, and demonstrations held. Students, already
energized by corrupt dealings within their universities, mobilized against
corruption. The issue was one reason why the fragmented opposition
began to unify in advance of the 2002 presidential election (Human
Rights Watch, 2002: 4–7). Once it became clear that Moi actually
would relinquish the presidency fissures deepened within KANU,
ultimately leading to the exit of the Kibaki faction which joined the
opposition to form NARC. But the land grabs were done – testament to
the risks of premature political liberalization, and to the difficulty of
creating countervailing forces sufficient to restrain corruption.
Kenya’s need was, and is, not just for elections, but for deeper democratization
and a sound, accountable state. That means more than just
rolling back the state role in the economy, instituting a measure of
electoral competition, and assuming that a healthy balance of forces will