CORRUPTION Syndromes of Corruption

46 Syndromes of Corruption
sporadic, manipulated, and ineffective, as will be the payment of official
salaries and other government obligations.
The result is corruption that is extensive, linked at times to violence,
and above all unpredictable; it is thus particularly damaging to democratic
and economic development (Campos, Lien, and Pradhan, 1999).
Much of the economy may be an off-the-books proposition; outside
investors will find it prudent to go elsewhere, while those who do venture
in will focus on short-term rewards rather than sustained growth (Keefer,
1996). Opposition and reform groups will enter the political arena at their
own risk; most citizens will leave politics to others. Those who do win
office will find themselves in a framework where formal checks and
balances amount in practice to fragmentation of authority creating access
points for oligarchs.
Russia is a high-profile case of this sort; Mexico and the Philippines
offer other variations on these themes. As we will see in chapter 6 the
Oligarch and Clan syndrome is not just ‘‘more corruption’’ than other
places; rather, it has a logic and implications all its own.
Official Mogul corruption In a final group of countries institutions
are very weak, politics remains undemocratic or is opening up only
slowly, but the economy is being liberalized at least to a degree. Civil
society is weak or non-existent. Opportunities for enrichment, and new
risks for the already wealthy, abound – but political power is personal, and
is often used with impunity.
Here, the entrepreneurs with most leverage will be top political figures
or their clients. Officials may become economic moguls; would-be
moguls need official backing. Once the political connections have been
made they face few constraints from the state framework or from competitors.
There is a risk – and in some cases the reality – of kleptocracy, or rule
by thieves (Andreski, 1968). Of our four corruption syndromes this one is
least focused upon influence within official state processes: institutions
and offices may be merely useful tools in the search for wealth. Ironically,
however, such situations are not necessarily stable: those who hold power
without rules may face foes who are similarly unconstrained, save by the
threat of violence. Neither rulers nor counter-elites (if any) are likely to
enjoy much sustained popular support or credibility beyond that created
through patronage or intimidation. In the worst of these cases one person,
a family, or a small junta enjoys unchecked rule. Military leaders may be
partners, and in some cases are dominant, in such regimes, often using
past corruption as a pretext for taking power. Even where the soldiers
have returned to their barracks top brass may be businessmen and politicians
too, backed by the threat of military intervention. Development of