CORRUPTION Syndromes of Corruption

Participation, institutions, and syndromes of corruption 45
Unlike the Elite Cartel syndrome, in which relatively established elites
collude within a moderately strong institutional framework, oligarchs are
free agents unlikely to cooperate for long. These elites are oligarchs in the
sense that much of the most significant competition takes place – often in
intensely personal terms – among relatively few players. But they and
their gains are insecure because of the pace and scope of change, the
unstructured nature and sheer scale of the stakes of contention, and
recurring violence. Weak institutions are a particular problem: inability
to enforce contracts or defend property through courts and law enforcement
increases the incentive to resort to violence (Varese, 2001), making
police and military muscle all the more marketable – and leading, in the
worst cases, to reliance upon mafiyas or private armies. Scott (1972) and
Knack and Keefer (1995) have pointed out that insecure elites will be
particularly rapacious.
As in the Elite Cartel syndrome, corruption will take place in pursuit of
both political and economic stakes, and will focus only partially upon
formal roles and policy processes. But in an Oligarchs and Clans situation
it may be difficult to say just what is public and what is private, who is a
politician and who is an entrepreneur, or even who is clearly corrupt and
who is an innovator. State officials and civil society will be ill-equipped to
resist or check abuses. The former will have few effective powers and will
be exposed to illicit pressures from within their agencies and without; the
latter, particularly in post-transition states, will likely be weak and
divided, its potential leaders intimidated or compromised. Those parts
of the news media not dominated by oligarchs themselves may well lack
the independence and resources needed to be effective watchdogs.
There is considerable political competition in this type of case, but it
can be unpredictable and may have shallow social roots. Contending
oligarchs building mass followings will find material rewards valuable
but difficult to come by; followers, for their part, will have many political
options. Political factions will thus be unstable and poorly disciplined.
Leaders, needing to pay for support again and again, will exploit any
fragments of government authority that may come to hand. Business
people may spend large sums for influence but get little from politicians
who cannot ‘‘deliver.’’ Where elections are rigged and political competition
unstructured and personal, reform-minded voters will find it difficult
to oust the corrupt or to reward good government. Anti-corruption efforts
in this setting will often be smokescreens for continued abuse or ways to
put key competitors behind bars. Privatization can become a legalized
carve-up of state resources or outright theft; regulatory and legal functions
will not only be moneymakers for poorly paid officials, but may also be
hijacked by oligarchs. Tax collections and payments are likely to be