CORRUPTION Syndromes of Corruption

198 Syndromes of Corruption
the political malaise of the United States and economic inflexibility of
Japan, and for the latter, Italy’s political crisis of 1993 or Mexico’s
apparent slide toward more disruptive corruption. As noted, Elite
Cartels can become inflexible and, over time, fragile (Nelken, 1996).
Elite Cartel corruption in Korea may have aided early growth but left
the country less able to avoid the meltdown of 1997. Still, elite political
settlements might help account for the contrast between rapid economic
growth in several Asian countries versus the devastating problems of
many African societies which, at independence, had economic prospects
comparable to those of their then-poor Asian competitors. In the Asian
cases a political-economic elite not only enriched but solidified by webs of
corrupt deals was able to pursue coherent economic development policies
and keep corruption predictable. The difficulties of many African states,
by contrast, were compounded by weak states, fragmented societies, and
insecure elites practicing unpredictable ‘‘hand over fist corruption’’
(Scott, 1972: 80–84).
Such speculation suggests that Influence Market and Elite Cartel
societies might embody two quite different strategies of reform – the
former a bureaucratic-technical-managerial strategy aimed at the reduction
and, as far as possible, eradication of corruption, and the latter a
political strategy containing its effects. Oligarch and Clan and Official
Mogul countries lack the institutional foundations of Influence Market
societies and their corruption problems make it difficult to build them;
the result too often is a high-corruption/low-development trap (Johnston,
1998). Building a sound framework of social, political, and state institutions
is the work of generations; Elite Cartel settlements might provide a
workable basis for democratic and economic development in the middle
term while being less threatening to elites who might otherwise resist
reform. It is by no means inevitable that Elite Cartel societies will go on
to build those national institutional frameworks (though I will suggest
below that the ‘‘consensus package’’ of transparency and administrative
reforms might be more appropriate to this syndrome than to any other),
and as noted Italy and Mexico provide sobering reminders of the risks of
this strategy. But the track records of bureaucratic reform efforts in the
Philippines, or of competitive elections in Kenya and Indonesia, are not
much more hopeful. A society that over time builds its economy and lays
the foundation for civil society under Elite Cartel leadership would seem
a better bet for eventual success.
The discussion of reform that follows is aimed at such questions of
middle- to long-term strategy. I will offer no new institutional or publicmanagement
remedies. Rather, the emphasis is on strengthening, and
striking a new balance between, participation and institutions, choosing