CORRUPTION Syndromes of Corruption

206 Syndromes of Corruption
can range from disclosure schemes to enhanced regulatory scrutiny of
companies’ capital and indebtedness to avoid Korean-style interlocking
structures of debt. Simply being able to figure out who owns what, and
which debts are owed to (and guaranteed by) whom, is critical both for
economic reform and for policing the political colonization of the economy.
Korea’s ‘‘real names’’ reforms of the 1993 thus potentially have
far-reaching implications. Those changes, in turn, will be more effective
where there is a free and competitive press.
These are all familiar measures. But their strategic purpose is to bring
political and policy processes out from behind their façades, and giving
both state and society more autonomy from inroads by networks of elites.
The goals are not only to improve the quality of government operations,
but also to deter collusion; foster a gradual increase in real and decisive
political competition; define clearer working boundaries among the state,
political processes, and the economy; give citizens more of an opportunity
to reward effective government and to oust the corrupt; and discourage
the interpenetration of political processes, the economy, elite networks,
and bureaucracy. These countries are in a position to benefit from ‘‘consensus’’
reforms because of the political and economic foundations built
by interlinked elites. That does not mean that the Elite Cartel syndrome is
some special kind of beneficial corruption; nor, as the case of Mexico
suggests, does it mean that a developing society basically has it made once
it arrives in this group. Rather, as suggested earlier, many Elite Cartel
countries have not so much controlled corruption as found a way to
withstand its effects for a time. Making the most of that finite opportunity
is a matter involving a gradual political transition in which elites’ abuses
and networks are curtailed and countervailing forces in society gather
strength, but not so rapidly that elites break up into warring clans or
engage in hand-over-fist corruption on their way out the door. That is a
delicate process indeed, one that will require a political process in which
elites who lose power at one point know they have not been sent out into
the wilderness, but rather can win another day through credible commitments
to govern well.
Oligarchs and Clans
The primary fact of Oligarch and Clan corruption is that economically
and politically ambitious elites are insecure. In a climate of rapidly
expanding but poorly institutionalized opportunities and contention
they build bases of personal support from which they exploit both state
and the economy, and protect their gains and interests by any means
necessary. In post-Soviet Russia that state of affairs led to a toxic mix of