CORRUPTION Syndromes of Corruption
CORRUPTION Syndromes of Corruption
CORRUPTION Syndromes of Corruption
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Participation, institutions, and syndromes <strong>of</strong> corruption 59<br />
Table 3.4: Countries included in case-study chapters<br />
Group/syndrome<br />
Cases<br />
1 Influence Markets (ch. 4) USA, Japan, Germany<br />
2 Elite Cartels (ch. 5) Italy, Korea, Botswana<br />
3 Oligarchs and Clans (ch. 6) Russia, Mexico, Philippines<br />
4 Official Moguls (ch. 7) China, Kenya, Indonesia<br />
testing the notion that patterns <strong>of</strong> corruption vary in ways symptomatic <strong>of</strong><br />
deeper processes and problems – a notion that applies to advanced<br />
societies just as much as to their poorer and less democratic neighbors.<br />
If case-study evidence supports those arguments we can then understand<br />
the roots and significance <strong>of</strong> corruption – and propose reforms – in terms<br />
appropriate to diverse societies.<br />
In the chapters that follow I seek to identify, explore, and account for<br />
the major corruption issues <strong>of</strong> twelve countries. These issues will not be<br />
identical within any group; indeed, some are included because they<br />
challenge the distinctions among syndromes in useful ways. The goal is<br />
to know whether a given corruption syndrome exists, how it works, how it<br />
reflects the interaction <strong>of</strong> participation and institutions, and how it affects<br />
democratic and economic development. The four groups <strong>of</strong> countries<br />
represent those corruption syndromes rather than ‘‘system types.’’ They<br />
illustrate what is at stake in a country’s corruption, how people and<br />
groups pursue, use, and exchange wealth and power, and how those<br />
processes are abetted or constrained by institutions and contending interests.<br />
Relative amounts <strong>of</strong> corruption, to the extent that they are even<br />
knowable, will be a secondary concern; longer-term effects are a more<br />
important theme, as are the sometimes perverse effects <strong>of</strong> reforms.<br />
To select any cases for detailed study is <strong>of</strong> necessity to limit the analysis:<br />
the groups <strong>of</strong> countries, and most <strong>of</strong> the societies within them, embody<br />
considerable diversity in their own right. Those selected from each cluster<br />
were chosen for several reasons including their inherent importance, the<br />
goal <strong>of</strong> covering as many regions as possible, and the extent <strong>of</strong> case-study<br />
information available for each: chapters 4–7 put the idea <strong>of</strong> contrasting<br />
corruption syndromes to a more detailed test. If the existence and nature<br />
<strong>of</strong> those syndromes can be established with reasonable confidence, then<br />
the discussion <strong>of</strong> reform in chapter 8 can draw upon both the breadth <strong>of</strong><br />
evidence underlying cross-sectional research, and the depth <strong>of</strong> detail and<br />
sensitivity to context found in good descriptive case studies, to develop<br />
ideas about the best ways <strong>of</strong> dealing with contrasting corruption problems<br />
in diverse social settings.