CORRUPTION Syndromes of Corruption

Participation, institutions, and syndromes of corruption 43
target government contracts, the implementation of policies, or specific
aspects of legislation, rather than creating black markets or parallel
economies. Some major channels may be legalized and regulated (such
as the financing of campaigns) while in others, rules and expectations can
be unclear (‘‘constituent service’’ by legislators). Public or private parties
may take the initiative, or be prime beneficiaries, but given the affluence
of most societies in this category wealthy interests seeking political influence
will dominate Influence Markets.
Further, a significant portion of the damage done by Influence Market
corruption is to the system. In chapter 4 I will suggest that the primary
costs of current political finance arrangements in the United States are
not that policies and roll-call votes are bought and sold – there is little
solid evidence that they are – but rather come in the form of reduced
public trust and widespread perceptions of abuses of power and privilege.
Such costs may be intangible, but over time they do little for the legitimacy
and responsiveness of democratic politics. Power- and spoilssharing
among German political parties may make for a less responsive
policy and legislative process. Japan’s Influence Markets have involved
much more illegal dealing, but for many years also helped underwrite
modified one-party politics in which key competition took place among
factions rather than different interests in society, and in which policy
adaptations took a back seat to keeping key supporters happy. Influence
Market societies do experience straightforward, transgressive corruption,
to be sure, but as suggested in chapter 1 the main concern is their systemic
corruption problems.
Elite Cartel corruption In other market democracies institutions
are weaker, politics and markets are becoming more competitive, and
networks of elites use corrupt incentives and exchanges to shore up their
positions.
The market-democratic model may not be as resistant to corruption as
we sometimes suppose, particularly where institutional frameworks are
weaker. New or reconstituted market democracies – South Korea, Chile,
Poland, Hungary – are still consolidating in important ways. Others pass
through times of crisis: Italy’s mani pulite and tangentopoli scandals of the
early 1990s, for example, were not a surge of new corruption but rather
consequences of the unraveling of collusive networks of party elites and
greater pressures from within and without for accountability. In those
kinds of cases power and its links to wealth are in flux, creating new
opportunities and risks for elites. For them, corruption may be defensive
in nature, protecting existing economic, political, or policy advantages,
preempting competitors, and strengthening connections with allies and