CORRUPTION Syndromes of Corruption

24 Syndromes of Corruption
at a given time, rather than in comparison with ideal processes; some of
those alternatives might be more harmful than corruption. Still another
view is that established and acceptable ways of doing things come to be
labeled corrupt by outsiders who do not understand the informal functions
such behavior might play in society. Such actions or exchanges
might confer or reaffirm status, build social alliances, or reduce conflict
among people and groups, for example. To judge such activities solely by
their systemic political or economic effects may be to ignore other, less
tangible, benefits at a personal or community level. Reforms that do not
address those social functions in alternative ways may well be doomed
to fail.
These views have many drawbacks, however. Too often they rest upon
hypothetical examples and treat corrupt dealings in isolation, rather than
exploring their broader and longer-term implications (Rose-Ackerman,
2002). Some who have argued for informal social functions of corrupt
activities tend to look much harder for beneficial implications than for
harmful ones; too often it is assumed that if a particular way of exchange,
or of seeking and using power and status, has existed within a society for
some time it must be superior to ideas originating elsewhere. As we shall
see below, recent research makes it difficult to maintain that there is
something inherently good about corruption. Still, the contrasting views
that have been debated over the years are useful reminders that corruption
cannot really be understood without reference to the political, economic,
institutional, and social setting within which it occurs.
The costs of corruption
Over the past fifteen years new evidence and refined theories have shown
that on the whole corruption delays and distorts political and economic
development. Unlike functionalist arguments these findings focus on real
processes and systemic, measurable consequences, rather than upon
specific or hypothetical deals in isolation (Rose-Ackerman, 2002).
Corrupt transactions, via the signals they send and incentives they confer,
can ripple through an entire economy or political system. Bribes that win
public contracts for an incompetent bidder, for example, reward inefficiency
and may discourage efficient firms from entering a country’s
economy. ‘‘Speed money’’ paid to bureaucrats does not break down
administrative bottlenecks (Wei, 1999); instead, it tells other officials
that they too can make money by dragging their feet.
Some of the damage done by extensive corruption is clear and direct:
when political figures and their business cronies divert aid and investment
to offshore bank accounts, poor nations become poorer. Where political