CORRUPTION Syndromes of Corruption

Influence Markets 81
political parties dominated by a unified LDP, built out of formerly
squabbling parties on the right, and including a unified (if much less
effective) socialist opposition (Johnson, 1995: 214; Mitchell, 1996: xvi,
109). The other is the ‘‘1941 system’’ of ‘‘bureaucracy-led industrial
cooperation’’ (Johnson, 1982; Johnson, 1995: 226) dominated by prestigious,
remote, highly able officials – a system that not only survived war,
devastation, and reconstruction but also guided Japan’s emergence as a
world economic power. The 1941 system made bureaucratic access and
influence essential, while the 1955 system turned them into marketable
political commodities. Together the 1955 system overlaid on the 1941
allowed top politicians with bureaucratic connections to offer credible
commitments (Woodall, 1996: 20; Pascha, 1999: 10).
The strength of bureaucratic institutions raised the ante – important
decisions were made by high-status bureaucrats who followed through
with great efficiency. A lack of access could mean not even being invited
to bid on construction contracts, for example, or – for an aspiring local
politician – not being able to take credit for projects or subsidies in a
constituency. Trading in influence at a high level required a zoku
(Johnson, 1995: 209–210; Blechinger, 2000) – a network or political
tribe. A zoku linked Diet members sharing an interest in a particular
kind of policy or sector of the economy to businesses and bureaucrats;
some zoku members became virtual industry spokespersons (Blechinger,
2000: 3).
If the LDP held a near-monopoly, why was electoral politics so expensive?
The answer has to do with both factionalism and the way Diet
members were elected before 1994 (Christensen, 1996; Seligmann,
1997). Most districts elected between two and six Diet members on a
ballot on which parties did not designate an official list of candidates. Real
political influence depended upon being an LDP Diet member, but
various factions’ candidates had to run against each other. Unable to
differentiate themselves on policy issues, candidates had to buy electoral
support. This they did by attending weddings, funerals, and other family
occasions (or sending one of their dozen or more local agents to such
affairs) and giving cash, often enclosed in an ornate gift card, to those
involved (Pharr, 2005). Over time politicians built koenkai – local support
networks of people sharing a recreational or cultural interest as well as a
political commitment – through such contributions. One ‘‘W. T.,’’ a
rank-and-file Lower House member, reported in 1976 that he gave out
ninety-three such gifts in a typical month, the costs of which could easily
exceed $1 million annually (Iga and Auerbach, 1977). Finding money on
that scale meant backing an LDP faction leader whose prestige within the
party was enhanced, in turn, by a large and active following. ‘‘Money