CORRUPTION Syndromes of Corruption

Influence Markets 71
risk may be extortion by top legislative leaders; in recent years their
power to rewrite bills late in the lawmaking process has grown significantly
(Sinclair, 2000).
Scholars have found little clear evidence that contributions buy rollcall
votes (Snyder, 1992; Wright,1996; Wawro,2001). This may seem
counterintuitive in light of cases such as the ‘‘bankruptcy reform’’ bills
that followed a campaign marked by unusually large donations by
banking PACs (Opensecrets.org, 2001), or pharmaceutical PACs’ contributions
preceding the Medicare prescription drug legislation of 2003
(Opensecrets.org, 2004a; Opensecrets.org, 2004b). But to attribute the
legislation solely to contributions is to ignore wider political dynamics.
In the bankruptcy case a pro-business Republican administration had
taken office and Republicans held majorities in both houses.
Prescription drug legislation treats the pharmaceutical industry very
well indeed, but senior-citizen groups were powerful advocates too. In
both cases opposition was weak and poorly organized. Contributors
have more clout at less visible levels – for example, as subcommittees
mark up bills, and as politicians interact informally among themselves
and with other officials on small policy details about which neither the
legislator nor constituents have strong sentiments (Etzioni, 1984: 9;
Denzau and Munger, 1986; Gierzynski, 2000: 9;Levine,2004). But
opportunities to provide such services arise only from time to time.
Many groups give to candidates and officials who are receptive to their
interests to begin with; while a representative of a dairy-farming district
may receive money from dairy PACs he or she has sound electoral
reasons to support their interests anyway. Conversely, many wellconnected
interests are not so much seeking change as hoping to prevent
it, and it is impossible to identify things that did not happen because of
donations. Wealth interests have always been powerful in American
politics, and contributions are made with expectations that ordinary
citizens are unlikely to have. But those interests would be powerful
under any system of campaign finance we might imagine, and their
ability to mobilize large contributions is at least as much a result of
their power as its cause.
Lobbyists, contributors, and candidates generally agree that while
donations do not buy legislative votes they do buy access – the opportunity
to make a case on a given issue. Access is limited and does not guarantee
favorable outcomes, but little can be accomplished without it. That is why
it is worth paying for. Still, the market for access raises questions about
the vitality of politics: a pervasive concern with fundraising can divert
attention from groups and issues, and from the constituency work, that
should be top priorities. The cumulative effects of spending most of one’s