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CORRUPTION Syndromes of Corruption

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18 <strong>Syndromes</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>Corruption</strong><br />

way to extensive agreement. The definitions issue has not so much been<br />

resolved as bypassed – wisely, for the most part – in order to focus upon<br />

processes that would qualify as corrupt by any definition. Still, bribery –<br />

particularly at high levels in the course <strong>of</strong> international aid, trade, and<br />

investment – has become a de facto synonym for corruption. Within that<br />

relatively narrow focus there is little debate anymore as to broad effects:<br />

strong theory and evidence suggest that corruption delays and distorts<br />

economic growth, rewards inefficiency, and short-circuits open competition<br />

(Kaufmann, Kraay, and Zoido-Lobatón, 1999; Rose-Ackerman,<br />

1999: chs. 2–5; Hall and Yago, 2000; Mauro, 2002). Findings relating<br />

to democratic development are less plentiful (Doig and Theobald,<br />

2000; Moreno, 2002), in part because within the consensus politics<br />

and the state have <strong>of</strong>ten been seen as impediments to economic liberalization.<br />

Still, evidence suggests moderate-to-low levels <strong>of</strong> corruption in<br />

most democracies (for a dissenting view see Lipset and Lenz, 2000).<br />

Far more serious problems occur where state institutions (Knack and<br />

Keefer, 1995; Rose-Ackerman, 1999), civil society (Ruzindana, 1997;<br />

Johnston, 2005a) and civil liberties (Isham, Kaufmann, and Pritchett,<br />

1995) are weak, where political competition is impaired (Johnston,<br />

2002; Della Porta, 2004), and where <strong>of</strong>ficials operate with impunity.<br />

Relativism – a sense that each society’s corruption issues are shaped in<br />

unique ways by historical and cultural variations, and that comparisons<br />

among diverse societies are therefore suspect – reflected laudable<br />

motives but discouraged all but the vaguest generalizations. That position<br />

has been overrun by numerical rankings <strong>of</strong> countries on worldwide<br />

league tables <strong>of</strong> corruption, and to propositions and findings extending<br />

across large numbers <strong>of</strong> societies (see, for example, Friedman, Johnson,<br />

Kaufmann, and Zoido-Lobatón, 2000; Sandholtz and Koetzle, 2000;<br />

Triesman, 2000; Kaufmann, 2004). Reticence about discussing corruption<br />

in developing countries and in agencies and programs seeking to<br />

aid them has given way to a recognition that it can no longer be written<br />

<strong>of</strong>f as a matter <strong>of</strong> differing customs or values.<br />

Partial visions<br />

Whether or not it fully qualifies as a ‘‘consensus’’ this outlook has<br />

moved us beyond some old, stale debates. We know much more than<br />

we did a generation ago, and there are far more resources with which<br />

to study the problem. But in other respects there may be too much<br />

consensus. The revival <strong>of</strong> interest has been driven primarily by business,<br />

and by international aid and lending institutions – groups that<br />

tend to view corruption as cause and consequence <strong>of</strong> incomplete

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