CORRUPTION Syndromes of Corruption

136 Syndromes of Corruption
in high-stake business (arbitrazh) court cases (Burger, 2004); a culture of
impunity is alive and well among state officials, and Putin himself has
conceded that anti-corruption measures since 2000 have had little effect
(Klussmann, 2004).
In the long run reforms will not succeed unless broad segments of
society recognize a stake in their success and are able to act on those
interests – a development that requires the sort of sustained, committed
political contention discussed in chapter 2. In that regard current trends
of political reform are grounds for pessimism (McFaul, Petrov, and
Ryabov, 2004). Recent anti-democratic moves by the Putin government,
including those to control the mass media and the effective renationalization
of key segments of Yukos, should not be confused with the solidification
of effective government. No more promising are Putin’s political
debts to the Yeltsin ‘‘family’’ and to other oligarchs who helped finance
his 2004 election campaign.
Corruption in Russia continues to evolve. Economic trends have been
broadly positive since the 1998 Ruble collapse, which channeled domestic
demand into locally produced goods, and rising oil prices have also
benefited the economy and state budget. Capital flight has declined since
2000 and, by some estimates, is now exceeded for the first time by
investment from abroad (Interfax, 2003). Business-related murders
peaked in the mid-1990s, some official law enforcement agencies are
gaining a measure of credibility, and a variety of private security firms
now compete with organized crime; some mafiya figures have moved into
legitimate business while others have shifted into more traditional criminal
activities (Volkov, 2002: ch. 4 and p. 125). The key variables to watch
will not be specific corrupt actions or reform initiatives, but rather the
overall strength of institutions and of the political and economic participation
that they do or do not protect and sustain. The flourishing of such
participation could be a first step toward building political institutions, a
civil society, and an accountable state capable of checking the oligarchs.
But if top state officials get the upper hand on both oligarchs and society
the result could well be something worse – perhaps the Official Moguls
syndrome to be outlined in chapter 7.
The Philippines: oligarchs, the Marcoses,
then ... oligarchs?
The late President Ferdinand Marcos, his powerful wife Imelda
Romualdez Marcos, and her world-class collection of dress shoes may
dominate popular images of corruption in the Philippines, but reality is
more complex and deeply rooted. Geography, colonialism under Spain