CORRUPTION Syndromes of Corruption

From analysis to reform 205
colonized by elite factions and their political parties, or riven by regional,
ethnic, or other divisions that not only have deep roots but definite
political uses for elites seeking to divide potential opposition groups and
keep them under control.
The behind-the-scenes collusion, favoritism, and the colonization of
bureaucracies and economic sectors that mark Elite Cartel corruption
suggest that the ‘‘consensus package’’ of liberalization, improved public
management, and enhanced transparency may be more productive in
Elite Cartel cases than elsewhere. These countries’ institutional frameworks
can sustain enhanced political and economic competition; those
trends, after all, are what the Elite Cartels are trying to contain. Such
competition and its decisiveness should increase gradually but steadily, as
Korea has done: competition that rises too abruptly may encourage
insecure elites to engage in hand-over-fist corruption (Scott, 1972:
80–84) or can, by fragmenting elite networks, produce the shift toward
Oligarch and Clan abuses we may be seeing in the case of Mexico.
Enhanced funding, from sources less open to manipulation by specific
elite factions, for bureaucracies and political parties will be needed if they
are to gain functional independence and, in the case of bureaucracies,
check those elites. Legal independence and greater professionalism for
agencies controlling major social benefit and public investment funds
must be guaranteed in meaningful ways, perhaps backed up by scrutiny
from independent commissions or the judiciary, to avoid episodes such as
the Development Bank scandals in Botswana. A stronger civil society
with a stake in effective, accountable government rather than in particular
elites will take a long time to emerge and must be sustained by a wide
range of incentives (Johnston and Kpundeh, 2002); anti-corruption or
good-government appeals by themselves are unlikely to be credible and
will encounter serious free-rider problems. Emerging civil society groups
will be better sustained by advocating their own interests, and even by
contending among themselves, than by organizing for public goods.
Institution-building can take many forms. Steps should include more
effective controls upon pantouflage (elite employment transitions back
and forth between public and private sectors), and upon lobbying, particularly
by former public or party officials. Legislation requiring open and
participative party governance and finance, and checks upon conflicts of
interest, may also reduce opportunities for collusion. The military must
be professionalized and clearly under civilian (as opposed to politicians’
personal) control. Effective, transparent, and fairer regulatory processes,
tax collection, and restraints upon black markets will also be worthwhile
investments. Enhanced transparency as regards banking, securities markets,
property rights, and elites’ business interests will also be useful; steps