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CORRUPTION Syndromes of Corruption

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124 <strong>Syndromes</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>Corruption</strong><br />

Influence Market countries. Property rights, corruption control, regulatory<br />

quality, and overall government effectiveness receive mediocre to<br />

poor ratings. Ratings for voice and accountability suggest that in the<br />

Philippines and Russia, at least, the powerful are confronted by few<br />

significant countervailing forces (table 6.1).<br />

Oligarch and Clan ‘‘corruption’’: complex meanings<br />

In rapidly changing societies with shaking institutional frameworks, connections<br />

between wealth and power are very complex. Indeed, as we<br />

move from Influence Market societies into Oligarch and Clan cases it<br />

becomes more difficult to use the term ‘‘corruption’’ in clear-cut ways.<br />

Laws and institutions are less clear and credible, and their uses are more<br />

arbitrary; state-like functions such as protection <strong>of</strong> property and contract<br />

enforcement are <strong>of</strong>ten provided by private figures. Often, the key is not<br />

whether a particular action fits formal definitions <strong>of</strong> corruption devised<br />

for societies with stronger institutions, but rather how people pursue and<br />

defend economic and political gains in a setting <strong>of</strong> weak institutions,<br />

major opportunities, and significant risk.<br />

It was with those difficulties in mind (among others) that I conceptualized<br />

corruption, in chapter 1, as a systemic problem rather than as a<br />

discrete category <strong>of</strong> behavior. This chapter will examine several such<br />

problems. For Russia I will focus upon corruption in processes <strong>of</strong> privatization<br />

and economic ‘‘reform,’’ but those issues also require discussion<br />

<strong>of</strong> organized crime and other activities that might elsewhere be defined as<br />

private. The arbitrary and corrupt ways such ‘‘private’’ domains have<br />

been created is a consequence <strong>of</strong> rapid liberalization and deeper institutional<br />

weaknesses. In Mexico we will consider corruption as a force in<br />

both legitimate (oil) and illegitimate (drug) markets, as well as in the PRI<br />

political machine. In the Philippines the entrenched influence <strong>of</strong> regional<br />

landholders is partly political, but their power and the weaknesses <strong>of</strong> the<br />

state reflect deeper developmental issues and perpetuate specific kinds <strong>of</strong><br />

corruption. Together these three cases can help us understand a syndrome<br />

<strong>of</strong> corruption quite different from those considered so far.<br />

Russia: risky biznis<br />

<strong>Corruption</strong> in Russia is pervasive, <strong>of</strong>ten organized along clan lines, harmful<br />

to democratic and economic development, and at times linked to violence.<br />

It is not, however, something new – nor are the mafiyas and politically wired<br />

entrepreneurs who make the headlines. All have been influenced by post-<br />

1991 developments, but all have roots in the Soviet past.

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