CORRUPTION Syndromes of Corruption

From analysis to reform 201
democracies are only middling at best, and in some instances seem to be
in significant decline. Inter-personal trust and perceptions of leaders and
institutions are matters of considerable concern too (Pharr and Putnam,
2000; Putnam, 2000). Perceived corruption is often a factor depressing
levels of trust in Japan (Pharr, 2000), and Americans’ views on the
influence of money (chapter 4) do little to increase participation in
politics there. The connection runs the other way too: can citizens
respond effectively by electing legislators through a political system in
which the flow of funds underwrites the status quo, and in which electoral
competition – as opposed to partisan contention – is weak? Germany’s
Proporz arrangements and the disinclination of voters and prosecutors to
punish top figures involved in scandals mean that even major corruption
rarely produces significant political change. Save for an interlude in the
mid-1990s, political competition in Japan continues to take place as
much within the LDP as among parties, and its dealings with business
profoundly shape policy. As a consequence, many Influence Market
societies are not as open as they may claim to be as they recommend
their own reform approaches to other parts of the world, and they avoid
key questions of justice by legalizing what some might see as abuses. Still,
these are not Elite Cartel arrangements: national elites are not using
corrupt incentives to shore up their collective position in the face of
growing competition, nor does corruption underwrite elite networks
embracing business leaders, bureaucrats, and military officials, as discussed
in chapter 5. Relationships among party elites are marked more by
stalemate than collusion (though the latter is not unheard of ) and tend
not to produce partisan colonization of the bureaucracy.
Ironically, Influence Market societies – widely regarded as successful
democracies, for the most part – must attend to their political weaknesses.
There is nothing inherently wrong with having parties and candidates
appeal to private citizens for financial backing, and allowing people to
express their political views with reasonable contributions. Such practices
could be one source of democratic vitality. Similarly, strong elected
officials and a measure of continuity are essential to electoral politics,
and parties and elected officials will always seek to make their positions
more secure. But where competition is more apparent than real, and
where citizens believe – rightly or wrongly – that monied interests dominate
politics and policy, participation suffers. Influence Market countries
should re-examine electoral and party laws, and pay particular attention
to their political finance systems. In the former category, Japan’s party-list
ballot system helped fuel corruption for many years. In the latter, the
American federal political finance system sets out to control outright
bribery rather than to encourage open, competitive politics yet, judging