CORRUPTION Syndromes of Corruption

164 Syndromes of Corruption
game are unable to take countervailing action (Gong, 1994: 151).
Would-be entrepreneurs learned that finding a sponsor or partner in the
party or bureaucracy was good business.
Some corruption is straightforward bribery: in Henan Province Zhang
Kuntong was imprisoned on bribery charges relating to road-building
contracts, as was Li Zhongshan in Sichuan Province. But city and provincial
officials often operate under-the-table business ventures. The
practice is sometimes called ‘‘sign-flipping,’’ reflecting the intermingling
of official authority and business. The rewards are large and, for those few
caught, the price is even greater: Hu Changqing, a former Vice-Governor
of Jiangxi Province, was sentenced to death in 2000 for bribery and
unexplained wealth. In that same year Zheng Daofang, deputy head of
transportation in Sichuan province, was sentenced to death on bribery
charges while his wife and son were imprisoned for unexplained wealth.
The issue in such cases is not just wealth but the balance of power, with
corruption allegations becoming weapons in the struggle. In Beijing in the
1990s Mayor Chen Xitong’s skill at amassing wealth touched off that sort
of struggle. Chen, his family, and his political clients engaged in numerous
illicit deals, but their real offense was to become a perceived political
threat to the national party leadership – part of long-running political
tensions between national politicians and Beijing city leaders. Chen was
forced out; along with his wealthy and powerful son Chen Xiaotong and
forty other local officials he was tried and imprisoned on corruption
charges. A senior vice-mayor committed suicide, and the city’s party
secre tary was later convic ted of corruption (BBC, 1998; Lü , 1999;
ABC News.com, 2000; Bo, 2000; Voice of America 2000; People’s
Daily Online, 2001a).
Tax fraud and embezzlement can also enrich officials and their allies
(Sun, 2004: ch. 3). Two tax bureaucrats and a former prosecutor created
fictitious corporations in the late 1990s, facilitating tax evasions totaling
over $7 million. The scheme featured repeated shipment of empty
containers between Guangdong and Hong Kong, backed by bogus
paperwork claiming value-added-tax rebates on fictitious exports. The
corporations did produce some goods, but they were sold locally, off the
books. The three officials and four others received death sentences in
early 2001. More recent export tax fraud cases may total 50 billion yuan
(about $6 billion) according to the Shanghai Customs Office. Xu Jie
and Du Jiansheng, two bureaucrats from Guizhou Province, were
given death sentences in late 2000 for embezzlements totaling nearly
$9 million. In 2001 several dozen provincial road-building officials
were convicted of embezzlement (CNN.com, 2001; People’s Daily
Online, 2001a).