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CORRUPTION Syndromes of Corruption

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3 Participation, institutions, and syndromes<br />

<strong>of</strong> corruption<br />

Opportunities, constraints, and corruption<br />

Understanding corruption in real social settings, and identifying the<br />

variations among cases that are most important, requires careful study<br />

<strong>of</strong> the contrasting political and economic opportunities available in<br />

various societies, <strong>of</strong> the people and groups who seek and use (or who<br />

are closed out <strong>of</strong> ) them, and <strong>of</strong> the institutions and norms that influence<br />

their choices. But what are the most important contrasts? Varying<br />

techniques (bribery, patronage) or the locations within the state seem<br />

natural beginnings, but the prevalence <strong>of</strong> a particular technique or<br />

venue <strong>of</strong> corruption would seem to be a response to the opportunities<br />

and constraints present in a given situation. Categorizing corruption<br />

by the scale <strong>of</strong> benefits involved would require much more<br />

information than we typically have and still might not tell us very<br />

much: does a case <strong>of</strong> a given monetary value have the same significance<br />

where corruption is the rule compared to places where it is the exception<br />

– or in a country where state <strong>of</strong>ficials have the upper hand versus<br />

another where they are at the mercy <strong>of</strong> economic interests? <strong>Corruption</strong><br />

may well follow some regional patterns – African/Asian contrasts are a<br />

prime example – but that is all the more reason to search for deeper<br />

influences.<br />

In this chapter I propose four corruption syndromes called ‘‘Influence<br />

Markets,’’ ‘‘Elite Cartels,’’ ‘‘Oligarchs and Clans,’’ and ‘‘Official Moguls.’’<br />

These syndromes, and the names suggesting their distinctive aspects,<br />

reflect frequently encountered combinations <strong>of</strong> stronger or weaker<br />

participation and institutions. I then employ widely used country-level<br />

indicators <strong>of</strong> participation and institutions to sort ninety-eight countries<br />

into corresponding groupings. Those data by themselves cannot tell us<br />

whether corruption varies in the expected ways: that is the task <strong>of</strong> the case<br />

studies presented in chapters 4 through 7. But they do provide a basis for<br />

selecting cases for study that is less likely to build in expected results<br />

beforehand.<br />

36

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