CORRUPTION Syndromes of Corruption

82 Syndromes of Corruption
politics’’ of this sort pre-dates 1955: Johnson (1995: 188–189) and
Samuels (2001) date it as far back as the early post-war Kishi government,
and Mitchell (1996: xvi) traces ‘‘structural corruption’’ back to the
1930s. But the 1955 party system, meshing with the 1941 bureaucratic
system, encouraged an influence market that was active, lucrative, and
essential to financing a highly factionalized and personalized style of
electoral politics.
Weak constraints
Those incentives were exacerbated by weak anti-corruption responses
(Castberg, 1997; Castberg, 2000: 437; Johnson, 2000: 64–76). From the
Shipbuilding scandal onwards corruption investigations were routinely
constrained or ended on political grounds. Prosecutors, who enjoyed
considerable prestige and had wide discretion in most other cases, treated
corruption allegations with caution, particularly when high-level figures
were involved. Lengthy court appeals could stretch a corruption case out
for decades: Tanaka Kakuei’s Lockheed convictions were still under
appeal when he died in 1993. In 1978, nearly nine out of ten corruption
convictions led to suspended sentences (Mitchell, 1996: 135). Before
1993, politicians who elsewhere might have been disgraced by scandal
could reclaim their power and prestige once they had spent some time
tending to the home constituency, and had been re-elected (Blechinger,
1999: 48–49).
Many reasons lie behind these weak restraints. At the elite level Japan’s
political culture encourages harmony and in some cases deference while
discouraging confrontation (Johnson, 1995: 8). Among citizens traditional
acceptance of authority, an emphasis upon personal connections rather
than upon formal roles, and the notion that favors (including political
support) deserve an equal return (such as gifts and local pork-barrel
projects) fostered tolerance for corruption (Mitchell, 1996: 135–137).
And the post-war state worked, rebuilding a devastated country and
delivering unprecedented standards of living.
Legally Japanese political parties were long regarded as private organizations,
and their financing and internal dealings were normally private
concerns too. Moreover, convictions in bribery cases bear a high burden
of proof: it must be shown not only that payments were made and
received, but also that the recipient knew they were bribes and had the
authority to deliver what was being paid for (Johnson, 2000: 68–72).
A politician can thus claim he thought payments were campaign contributions,
or say he had no way of providing the benefits expected, and thus
stand a strong chance of acquittal or a suspended sentence. Political