CORRUPTION Syndromes of Corruption

90 Syndromes of Corruption
place not only between public officials and private interests, or between
political leaders and mass followers, but also among hegemonic political,
bureaucratic, and business figures. The point is not to influence specific
policies (although that can certainly be the immediate reward) but rather to
stymie or co-opt competitors, amass enough influence to govern, and
insulate economic and policy advantages from electoral and social pressures.
Even where Elite Cartel corruption is extensive, the state may be
neither wholly ‘‘captured’’ nor predatory (see, for Korea, Cheng and Chu,
2002: 57), for the emphasis is upon integrating political and economic
power rather than upon giving either a decisive advantage over the other.
Elite Cartel societies may have significant anti-corruption activity: indeed,
the political opposition may essentially consist of those excluded from
corrupt dealings, and vice versa. And there will be no shortage of official
anti-corruption proclamations and campaigns, though often they will be
used to punish dissidents or rivals rather than to pursue reform as such.
Elite Cartel corruption is centralized, organized, and relatively predictable
in its scope and processes. Paradoxically, where Elite Cartels are
strong the breadth or frequency of corrupt activities (difficult as such
judgments are) may be somewhat reduced in favor of fewer, larger, highlevel
deals reflecting and sustaining elite cohesion. For these reasons
among others Elite Cartel corruption can coexist with rapid economic
development, at least for a time. On the democratic development side,
however, the damage is significant: the point, after all, is to stave off
competition, demands for accountability, and the possibility of losing
power – even when the votes go the wrong way.
Elite Cartel corruption is thus an illicit substitute for weak institutions –
one with potential uses to be examined in our discussion of reform in
chapter 8. But it is an imperfect substitute at best, often depending upon
other forces – coercion, shared group identity, or a perceived threat from
without – for some of its cohesion. The political and policy alignments it
sustains can become rigid and out of step with changing realities; and when
Elite Cartel networks do change, it is often sharply and discontinuously. The
outcome may be greater democracy – or disruption and renewed oppression.
Three cases
In this chapter I will examine Elite Cartel corruption in Italy, Korea, 1 and
Botswana. In Italy two generations of political collusion, bound together
by a pact to bar the Communists from power, built a multiparty electoral
1 For reasons of convenience the term ‘‘Korea’’ refers here to the Republic of Korea, or
South Korea.