CORRUPTION Syndromes of Corruption

192 Syndromes of Corruption
from their behavior. Third, arguments from deep-rooted cultural
factors are not well-suited to account for change (Bufacchi and Burgess,
1998: 90).
Still, my argument is emphatically not that culture is unimportant as
regards corruption. Rather, it is that we must be specific about where and
how it is important rather than making culture the explanation of first
resort. Culture is particularly relevant to reform, a point to which I will
return below. How people respond to corruption, to the changing opportunities
and constraints that shape its forms, and to elites and institutions
are questions with profound cultural dimensions (consider the role of
family and region in Korea, or of tribal identity in Kenya), and those
connections are noted in the case studies. The role of guarantors for
corrupt deals will also be rooted in social trust and traditions of authority
and exchange (recall the importance of organized crime as a key guarantor
in southern Italy). So too is the significance, in the broadest sense of
that term, that people see in corruption issues. As research proceeds
many of the problems noted above will be minimized, and as that occurs
an understanding of the varying syndromes of corruption will be essential
to make the most of cultural insights.
The typology and data
Any typology of the sort employed here is at best a useful simplification. It
reflects a range of assumptions and choices, as acknowledged above, and
will lay out concepts and interrelationships in general terms. The four
categories proposed in chapter 3 spring from the first of our three major
questions about links among political and economic liberalization, the
strength of institutions, and variations in corruption. They rest on several
assumptions: first, that corruption is not something that ‘‘happens to’’ a
society, but rather is embedded in deeper processes of economic and
political change; second, that those changes are not only characteristics of
countries but are also experienced as real opportunities and constraints;
and third, that people will respond to those opportunities and constraints
in understandable ways. The hypothesized corruption syndromes may
best be regarded as ideal types (see Coser, 1977: 223–224) useful for
guiding more detailed analysis of cases.
Operationalizing the typology raises more problems. Country-level
political and economic indicators, some more valid and reliable than
others, have proliferated in recent years. Nearly all are attempts to measure
elusive aspects of state functions (accountability, security of property
rights, and of course corruption). Many are based at least in part upon
surveys of public or expert opinion; some are so recent in origin that we