CORRUPTION Syndromes of Corruption
CORRUPTION Syndromes of Corruption
CORRUPTION Syndromes of Corruption
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Oligarchs and Clans 141<br />
election fraud – backed up where necessary by violence – and selfenrichment<br />
by presidential cronies were common. Both the state and<br />
businesses depended on American capital, and the state was further<br />
weakened by persistent guerrilla warfare in some provinces. Political<br />
parties were weak, personalized, and all but indistinguishable on ideological<br />
grounds; the real competition was among factions seeking to elect<br />
friendly presidents who could grant access to credit, foreign aid, and tax<br />
and tariff favors (Stanley, 1974, as cited in Hutchcr<strong>of</strong>t, 1991 at n. 19;<br />
Hutchcr<strong>of</strong>t, 1991, 1998; Batalla, 2000; Kang, 2002a).<br />
When Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos became President and First Lady<br />
in 1965 their joint net worth was only about US$7,000. By 1986 that figure<br />
had climbed to between US$5 and 10 billion. Martial law, beginning in<br />
1972, made it easier for Marcos to enrich himself and his cronies. For<br />
example, he imposed a special tax on coconuts and copra to be collected by<br />
an agency run by Eduardo Conjuangco, a member <strong>of</strong> his inner circle. With<br />
the proceeds Conjuangco acquired a bank, using one <strong>of</strong> its subsidiaries to<br />
buy coconut processing facilities. Marcos then ordered that subsidies once<br />
available across the industry be restricted to that subsidiary, creating<br />
‘‘a near monopoly over the export <strong>of</strong> coconuts and copra’’ (Wedeman,<br />
1997a: 471). Similar maneuvers created a sugar exporting monopoly for<br />
crony Robert Benedicto; eventually his firm was reorganized into a quasiregulatory<br />
body empowered to set domestic prices. Marcos backers<br />
Herminio Disini and Lucio Tan put competing cigarette companies out<br />
<strong>of</strong> business with the help <strong>of</strong> favorable import–export policies; kickbacks<br />
and equity interests in such dealings flowed to Marcos himself (Aquino,<br />
1987;Hawes,1987: chs.2,3;Wedeman,1997a: 471; Chaikin, 2000).<br />
Imelda Marcos not only became an international symbol <strong>of</strong> conspicuous<br />
consumption but also held a business empire <strong>of</strong> her own. She helped<br />
channel foreign aid, bribe income, and funds from organized crime into a<br />
series <strong>of</strong> bank accounts and asset funds. As Mayor <strong>of</strong> Metro Manila,<br />
Minister <strong>of</strong> Human Settlements, and head <strong>of</strong> a regional development<br />
authority she was in a position to award lucrative construction contracts<br />
in exchange for a percentage <strong>of</strong> the action. But the largest share <strong>of</strong> the<br />
wealth likely came from outright theft: during the Marcoses’ reign an<br />
estimated US$5 billion disappeared from the national treasury.<br />
Ferdinand Marcos died in Hawaii in 1989, but in 1993 Imelda brought<br />
his body back for reburial and continued her attempts to re-enter politics.<br />
Imelda was convicted, but not imprisoned, as a result <strong>of</strong> a 1993 corruption<br />
trial; late in the 1990s she was charged with embezzling US$680<br />
million. In 2003 the Philippine Supreme Court ruled that those funds,<br />
held in Swiss bank accounts, had been stolen, and that Imelda would have<br />
to stand trial. At the same time she was facing another ten counts <strong>of</strong>