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CORRUPTION Syndromes of Corruption

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Oligarchs and Clans 141<br />

election fraud – backed up where necessary by violence – and selfenrichment<br />

by presidential cronies were common. Both the state and<br />

businesses depended on American capital, and the state was further<br />

weakened by persistent guerrilla warfare in some provinces. Political<br />

parties were weak, personalized, and all but indistinguishable on ideological<br />

grounds; the real competition was among factions seeking to elect<br />

friendly presidents who could grant access to credit, foreign aid, and tax<br />

and tariff favors (Stanley, 1974, as cited in Hutchcr<strong>of</strong>t, 1991 at n. 19;<br />

Hutchcr<strong>of</strong>t, 1991, 1998; Batalla, 2000; Kang, 2002a).<br />

When Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos became President and First Lady<br />

in 1965 their joint net worth was only about US$7,000. By 1986 that figure<br />

had climbed to between US$5 and 10 billion. Martial law, beginning in<br />

1972, made it easier for Marcos to enrich himself and his cronies. For<br />

example, he imposed a special tax on coconuts and copra to be collected by<br />

an agency run by Eduardo Conjuangco, a member <strong>of</strong> his inner circle. With<br />

the proceeds Conjuangco acquired a bank, using one <strong>of</strong> its subsidiaries to<br />

buy coconut processing facilities. Marcos then ordered that subsidies once<br />

available across the industry be restricted to that subsidiary, creating<br />

‘‘a near monopoly over the export <strong>of</strong> coconuts and copra’’ (Wedeman,<br />

1997a: 471). Similar maneuvers created a sugar exporting monopoly for<br />

crony Robert Benedicto; eventually his firm was reorganized into a quasiregulatory<br />

body empowered to set domestic prices. Marcos backers<br />

Herminio Disini and Lucio Tan put competing cigarette companies out<br />

<strong>of</strong> business with the help <strong>of</strong> favorable import–export policies; kickbacks<br />

and equity interests in such dealings flowed to Marcos himself (Aquino,<br />

1987;Hawes,1987: chs.2,3;Wedeman,1997a: 471; Chaikin, 2000).<br />

Imelda Marcos not only became an international symbol <strong>of</strong> conspicuous<br />

consumption but also held a business empire <strong>of</strong> her own. She helped<br />

channel foreign aid, bribe income, and funds from organized crime into a<br />

series <strong>of</strong> bank accounts and asset funds. As Mayor <strong>of</strong> Metro Manila,<br />

Minister <strong>of</strong> Human Settlements, and head <strong>of</strong> a regional development<br />

authority she was in a position to award lucrative construction contracts<br />

in exchange for a percentage <strong>of</strong> the action. But the largest share <strong>of</strong> the<br />

wealth likely came from outright theft: during the Marcoses’ reign an<br />

estimated US$5 billion disappeared from the national treasury.<br />

Ferdinand Marcos died in Hawaii in 1989, but in 1993 Imelda brought<br />

his body back for reburial and continued her attempts to re-enter politics.<br />

Imelda was convicted, but not imprisoned, as a result <strong>of</strong> a 1993 corruption<br />

trial; late in the 1990s she was charged with embezzling US$680<br />

million. In 2003 the Philippine Supreme Court ruled that those funds,<br />

held in Swiss bank accounts, had been stolen, and that Imelda would have<br />

to stand trial. At the same time she was facing another ten counts <strong>of</strong>

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