CORRUPTION Syndromes of Corruption

From analysis to reform 219
between the GDP-and-elections development agendas of the past generation,
on the one hand, and the full scope of change needed to control
corruption, and reasons for doing so, on the other. A society actively
pursuing deep democratization and justice will still have corruption, and
may have to live with upheavals, at least for a time. But over time it can
develop a capacity for avoiding the worst dilemmas seen in our case
studies – a capacity rooted not just in punishments and administrative
procedures but in the vitality of society itself.
Conclusion
We have come a long way from a discussion of corruption and development
in an era of liberalization and globalization to a consideration of
strategies for reform. All of these issues, however, have common dimensions
of democracy, accountability, and justice, and unlike many other
critics I believe most advocates of ‘‘consensus’’ policy are genuinely
motivated by their understandings of those same issues. Still, those issues
frame an urgent debate over the ways wealth and power can be pursued,
used, and exchanged – a debate most notable by its absence in contemporary
policymaking. And they are the reasons why corruption is worth
our concern in the first place: all revolve around the fundamental right of
human beings to a good life and to participate in decisions affecting their
lives. I have tried to show that those concerns are not only the ends, but
also essential means, of reform.
As noted at the outset the revival of interest in corruption has reflected
interests and organizations central to globalization, and has been driven
by a sense that corruption not only impedes economic growth and integration
but is also on the rise. Those connections have been made in a
narrow and technical way, for the most part: at the level of observed
behavior, corruption was seen primarily as bribery, part and parcel of
imperfect or politically blocked processes of exchange. Politics and the
state have been envisioned, at best, as technical facilitators of markets,
and at worst as the essence of the corruption problem. Not surprisingly
public institutions were for many years secondary concerns in most discussions
of reform.
Therein lies a less-recognized risk of the consensus liberalization
agenda: we could conceivably minimize corruption – in a definitional
sense at least – by doing away with public power and roles. But would we
have reduced corruption in a real sense, or just have privatized it (Johnston,
2001a)? And would we like the world that would result? In my view the
economic liberalization of the past generation has, paradoxically, made
clearer than ever the need for strong and accountable institutions that are