CORRUPTION Syndromes of Corruption

114 Syndromes of Corruption
Competitive politics has raised the costs of campaigns, driving demands
for cash upwards. Kang (2002b: 195) reports estimates of 200–300 billion
won, or $266–400 million, for the total expenditures in the 1981 National
Assembly election, compared to more than 1 trillion won (about $1.3
billion) for the 1996 campaign; total presidential campaign expenditures
were estimated at 443 billion won ($590 million) in 1987, and 2 trillion won
($2.7 billion) in 1997. The 1997 presidential total is roughly on a par with
all federal election expenditures in the United States – which has over five
times Korea’s population – in 2000. Some of these increases reflect the
growth of Korea’s economy and population, and inflation is a factor too.
Moreover, not all of this money came from business; some was raised
through legitimate contributions, and other funds have been corruptly
diverted from the national budget over the years (Park Byeog-Seog,
1995: 175–176). But pressure upon business for contributions has intensified
(Moran, 1999: 573) and businesses will still pay to reduce political
uncertainties (Root, 1996: 167–168).
Can Elite Cartel corruption continue on such a scale? There are
reasons to think it cannot. Lobbying activities recognizable in any democracy
have become more common (Park Byeog-Seog, 1995: 183).
As parties and civil society become stronger, political uncertainties may
become more manageable: real competition would bring risk of defeat,
but a strong electoral system would guarantee opportunities to win future
elections. Democracy could weaken the force of clientelism (Kim Joongi,
2002: 184–185) and clan ties may give way to more fluid political
competition. Global competition and international pressures to improve
both public- and private-sector governance may make chaebols less able
to pay (and to conceal) the price of political influence, and the
state less able to maintain politically protected lending markets and
policy favors.
If Elite Cartel corruption should break down, however, the alternative
will not be no corruption. Korea might become more like Japan and other
Influence Market societies. For that to happen institutions would have to
continue to strengthen while the economic and political competition
would need to become more predictable. Such trends seem likely and,
in the case of institutional development, are already underway. But if
those changes are derailed, key figures in a less-unified elite may turn to
personal followings, influence within their own segments of the state and
economy, and perhaps even violence to protect their interests. While that
seems a less likely scenario, our case discussion of Mexico in chapter 6 will
suggest that Elite Cartel corruption can change in some very worrisome
ways. Governing Korea is a changed task early in the twenty-first century,
but that does not mean it has become easy.