CORRUPTION Syndromes of Corruption

From analysis to reform 187
What have we learned?
We began with three questions: What are the links among political and
economic liberalization, the strength or weakness of state, political, and
social institutions, and the kinds of corruption societies experience? What
syndromes of corruption result from various combinations of those influences
and how do they differ? What kinds of reform are – and are not –
appropriate for these contrasting corruption problems?
A definitive answer to the first question would require a comprehensive
critique of globalization, both as a bundle of processes and as an influence
upon international policymaking, and knowledge of the full extent of
corruption that we are unlikely ever to have. Still, I have sought to demonstrate
connections by comparing the ways people pursue, use, and
exchange wealth and power within the context of institutions of varying
strength and composition. Trends in political and economic liberalization
are among the defining characteristics of our four syndromes, both conceptually
and in the data analysis. ‘‘Institutions’’ are understood here in
broad terms: not just constitutional or administrative, but also political and
social. In some cases the national bureaucracy is the institutional focus,
while in others the state of political parties or patterns of traditional
authority in society are critical – a level of variation that consensus prescriptions
about governance tend to overlook. Diverse combinations of
participation and institutions guide the response to the second question, as
seen in the categories and scenarios offered in chapter 3. The notion of
syndromes is important: it emphasizes not only distinctive patterns of
corruption but also complex webs of cause and effect.
Reform – the third issue – is a matter of strengthening and balancing
both participation and institutions over the long term. Worthwhile
schemes for improving public management and strengthening civil
society abound, as do calls for ‘‘political will,’’ but elites and society
must have a stake in their success. Even then the criterion for success
may not be whether aggregate levels of corruption are decreasing: often
that is impossible to judge, and change may also be qualitative. At one
level, successful reforms will help a society withstand corruption and may
shift the problem itself toward less disruptive forms. But at a more basic
level the issue is justice – enhancing citizens’ ability to pursue and defend
their own economic and political wellbeing free from abuse and exploitation
by political and economic elites. The opportunity to participate in
open, competitive, and fair political and economic processes, and the
ability of institutions to sustain those processes and link them to each
other while restraining their excesses, are both defining characteristics of
our four syndromes and ultimate goals of reform.