CORRUPTION Syndromes of Corruption

178 Syndromes of Corruption
government. The legislative branch was reconstituted in 2004 into a
popularly elected House of Representatives and House of Regional
Representatives. The economy, weaker than before the Asian crisis of
1997, has been growing at about 3 or 4 percent annually in recent years
and produces a GDP per capita of around $3,100. Over a quarter of the
population lives in poverty, however, and many more are underemployed
or living near the poverty line (World Factbook Online 2004). Despite – or,
perhaps, because of – democratization, the governments that followed
Suharto, lacking his mechanisms of control, have been less effective at
sustaining growth and have had even less success in restraining corruption.
New Order corruption
Indonesia would be difficult to govern under the best of circumstances.
A Dutch colony until 1949, the country spans 3,500 miles or more of ocean
and islands from Sumatra in the west to Irian Jaya in the east. Its 235
million people live in twenty-seven provinces encompassing about 6,000
of its over 17,000 total islands, with a total land area of approximately
750,000 square miles. Javanese (45 percent) are the dominant ethnic
group, and Islam (88 percent) is by far the largest religion, but much of
the nation is divided by ethnicity, language, and geography, which in
areas such as Aceh and East Timor (the latter granted independence in
2002) have produced extensive conflict (World Factbook Online, 2004).
Suharto’s New Order was presented to Indonesians as a form of
national, social, and political redemption through strong presidential
leadership. When then-General Suharto and his fellow military plotters
took power after seeing off a 1965 coup attempt by communist forces they
promised security – an end to contention between often-abusive local
leaders and radicals – and development, aided by extensive international
aid (Cole, 2001: 14). Corruption from the top down was not only a
temptation, but also the essence of political strategy: the loyalties of
local elites, bureaucrats, military leaders, and would-be politicians and
businessmen could not be compelled in such a large and far-flung nation,
but they could be bought. Suharto began the construction of an extensive
patronage system that by the 1980s distributed benefits and bought
support throughout the country (Makarim, 2001: 6). Spoils were
obtained from dummy lines on (and off) the national budget, or from
government and foreign aid funds that were simply stolen; from the
proceeds of military-run businesses, at least until the economic liberalization
of the 1980s; from kickbacks on construction and development
contracts, and from international businesses receiving key concessions;
and from a string of personal ‘‘foundations’’ operated by Suharto himself