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CORRUPTION Syndromes of Corruption

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88 <strong>Syndromes</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>Corruption</strong><br />

into separate categories may seem an error. But there are important<br />

contrasts too. For most <strong>of</strong> the post-war era Japanese politics revolved<br />

around competitive elections – even if the competition was as much<br />

within the LDP as between it and other parties – while Korea remained<br />

a dictatorship. Korea is still consolidating democratic political processes<br />

and key regulatory institutions. Japan’s bureaucracy was widely regarded<br />

as independent – even remote – but <strong>of</strong> high quality for most <strong>of</strong> that period,<br />

while Korea’s was more politicized – colonized in important respects<br />

by the personal networks <strong>of</strong> top national figures. Both economies are<br />

dominated by huge industrial combines, but Japan’s were not the objects<br />

<strong>of</strong> manipulation by political leaders in the ways Korea’s chaebols were for<br />

many years. Japan’s national political elite is larger and less tight-knit than<br />

Korea’s. Korean corruption was shaped much more by collusion among a<br />

tight-knit national elite – one that for many years possessed a political<br />

monopoly sustained partly by coercion but also by the shared spoils <strong>of</strong><br />

corruption. More recently Korean elites have used corrupt influence as a<br />

kind <strong>of</strong> rearguard action against rising political competition and economic<br />

liberalization – unlike their Japanese counterparts who found the<br />

threat <strong>of</strong> political competition quite useful as a way to extract money from<br />

businesses.<br />

‘‘Money politics’’ has indeed been the style <strong>of</strong> corruption in both Japan<br />

and Korea, but the alignments <strong>of</strong> interests it served, its relationship to<br />

political competition, and the role played by strong (Japan) versus weaker<br />

(Korea) state institutions, have differed considerably for most <strong>of</strong> the past<br />

half-century – enough so to justify the two countries’ places in different<br />

categories <strong>of</strong> corruption. These contrasts reflect combinations <strong>of</strong> participation<br />

and institutions that differ from the Influence Market syndrome.<br />

They will become clearer as we look at Korea, along with Italy and<br />

Botswana, in our discussion <strong>of</strong> Elite Cartel corruption in chapter 5.

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