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CORRUPTION Syndromes of Corruption

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6 Oligarchs and Clans: we are<br />

family – and you’re not<br />

Introduction: high stakes, insecurity,<br />

and personal power<br />

Oleg Deripaska, one <strong>of</strong> Russia’s most aggressive biznis oligarchs, had his<br />

eye on an industrial plant in the nation’s Far East not long ago. He got<br />

what he wanted, not through a buyout but by bringing a low-pr<strong>of</strong>ile legal<br />

proceeding before a friendly judge in a court thousands <strong>of</strong> miles to the<br />

west. The plant’s rightful owners, knowing nothing <strong>of</strong> the case, defaulted<br />

on the judgment; equally friendly local police then helped Deripaska seize<br />

the plant (Tavernise, 2002a, 2002b; Agence France-Presse, 2003). In the<br />

Philippines several generations <strong>of</strong> the Lopez family – landowners, sugar<br />

producers, and political figures in the West Visayas region – saw their<br />

wealth and power rise and fall depending on who held the nation’s<br />

presidency. Under Ferdinand Marcos their interests suffered – <strong>of</strong>ten,<br />

from ‘‘reforms’’ targeted at those Marcos personally opposed. After the<br />

Aquino ‘‘People Power’’ revolution, however, the Lopez family reinvented<br />

itself as a media conglomerate whose political connections were<br />

as essential as its satellite network (McCoy, 1993). In Mexico drug lords<br />

and their armed gangs dominate some areas, engaging in legal as well as<br />

illicit business, money laundering, and politics. Often they operate with<br />

the protection <strong>of</strong> local police.<br />

In cases like these it is hard to distinguish among organized crime,<br />

state <strong>of</strong>ficials, and corrupt politicians (Leitzel, 2002: 37). A relatively<br />

small number <strong>of</strong> individuals use wealth, political power, and <strong>of</strong>ten<br />

violence to contend over major stakes, and to reward their followers, in<br />

a setting where institutional checks and legal guarantees may mean<br />

little. Their power is neither clearly public nor private – <strong>of</strong>ten, it is both –<br />

but it is definitely personal. Political and economic opportunities<br />

are great and gains can be difficult to protect; those brave (or foolish)<br />

enough to investigate or publicly oppose such dealings may pay with<br />

their lives.<br />

120

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