CORRUPTION Syndromes of Corruption

Elite Cartels 113
predict, and potentially disruptive. Economic competition was a threat to
the thirty or so chaebols that dominated the economy. In both instances it
was the unpredictability of such challenges, more than their absolute
strength, that was unsettling; Elite Cartel corruption was a way to buy
or rent predictability at a systemic level.
Present and future
Scandals and corruption continue to be facts of life in Korea (Ha, 2001:
33–34), and top political figures, including recently departed President
Kim Dae Jung, continue to be viewed with suspicion (French, 2003).
But now political competition has broadened in scope, civil society has
become stronger (Koo, 2002; Steinberg,2000), and since 1997 chaebol
and banking reform have gained considerable momentum (Cho
Juyeong, 2004; ChoMyeong-Hyeon,2003; Woo-Cumings, 1999b).
Presidential elections now are civilian affairs; in 1997 Kim Dae Jung,
who not only was an opposition leader but hailed from the longneglected
Cholla region, was elected President. The 2002 presidential
elections led to another peaceful handover of power – indeed, at the
inaugration of Roh Moo Hyun, in February 2003, the disgraced former
Presidents Chun and Roh Tae Woo made rare public appearances,
perhaps to symbolize continuity. Korean democracy is still a work in
progress; by early 2004 Roh was embroiled in an impeachment effort
which he survived, thanks to favorable election results (Brooke, 2004)
and a subsequent Constitutional Court ruling that while he had violated
laws removal from office was not warranted.
Elite Cartel corruption survives in this new setting (Moran, 1999;
Steinberg, 2000: 210–211; Kang, 2002b: 193–198), but change is visible
too, not all of it reassuring. As in Italy Elite Cartels need ways to
guarantee corrupt deals and control factional conflict (Wedeman,
1997a: 474; Schopf, 2001: 708). Coordination was aided by the fact
that in Korea’s relatively small elite stratum (Tat, 1996: 545; Kang,
2002b: 201) the spoils only had to be divided so many ways. For four
decades after independence force was integral to the process too. But
democratization has eroded the military presence in politics, enlarged
the political elite, and created more divisions and competition within it.
The result has hardly been an end to corruption: if anything, the Hanbo
case showed that now more officials might have to be bribed, while their
ability to deliver is less clear. Democracy strengthened the hand of
business while making politicians and the state less effective as risk
guarantors (Cheng and Chu, 2002: 57); Tat (1996: 54) sees increased
business initiative in offering bribes as one result.