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CORRUPTION Syndromes of Corruption

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The international setting 31<br />

indeed, entrenched <strong>of</strong>ficials can write election legislation that does little<br />

to restrain their own campaigns and their contributors’ activities.<br />

Contrasting corruption problems<br />

Recent scholarship thus makes a strong case that corruption harms economic<br />

and democratic political development. But two further points<br />

emerge from the preceding discussion. First, corruption is both a cause<br />

and an effect <strong>of</strong> such difficulties – in many ways, a symptom <strong>of</strong> deep-rooted<br />

problems in the emergence <strong>of</strong>, and balance between, participation and<br />

institutions. Second, these interconnections are complex and variable:<br />

there are many possible permutations <strong>of</strong>, and strengths and weaknesses<br />

in, participation and institutions. <strong>Corruption</strong> is thus unlikely to be the<br />

same problem everywhere, and scores along one-dimensional indices<br />

may tell us little about different sorts <strong>of</strong> societies.<br />

<strong>Corruption</strong> as people live it<br />

People and societies experience corruption in diverse ways. Patronage<br />

machines (Mexico’s PRI), informal enterprises and self-dealing in a gray<br />

area between the public and private sectors (China), extensive payments<br />

by candidates to voters (Japan), politicized credit and development policies<br />

(Korea), a sense <strong>of</strong> scandal surrounding private interests’ contributions<br />

to parties and candidates (the United States and many other<br />

democracies), <strong>of</strong>ficial theft <strong>of</strong> public land for use as rewards for prominent<br />

political backers (Kenya), and extortion practiced by police upon<br />

small businesses and farmers (many poor countries) draw upon contrasting<br />

kinds <strong>of</strong> power and resources, capitalize upon diverse institutional<br />

problems and social vulnerabilities, create different sorts <strong>of</strong> winners and<br />

losers, and embody differing distributions <strong>of</strong>, and relationships between,<br />

wealth and power.<br />

Contrasts abound at other levels too. Democratization in much <strong>of</strong><br />

Central Europe, and in the Philippines, has not markedly reduced corruption.<br />

Democracy in India continues to survive despite significant<br />

corruption and desperate poverty; Italy and Japan are established democracies<br />

with relatively strong economies and a long tradition <strong>of</strong> extensive<br />

corruption, marked in the past by major scandals. In some places corruption<br />

and violence are closely linked, while in others the former may be a<br />

substitute for the latter (Huntington, 1968). For thirty years high levels <strong>of</strong><br />

corruption coexisted with (and in some ways may have aided) rapid<br />

economic growth in East and Southeast Asia, while in Africa it helped<br />

keep people and countries poor. In the US and many other democracies

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