CORRUPTION Syndromes of Corruption

118 Syndromes of Corruption
or sharing of spoils among cartels of party leaders – while understating the
complexity of the elite networks that are built up, and of the political and
economic implications for society.
Neither view is supported by these cases. While Elite Cartels can
compensate for weaknesses in official institutions – an idea with possible
reform potential, explored in greater detail in chapter 8 – they are built
and maintained, first and foremost, to protect the interests of their
members. That those elites and interests may be growth-oriented, as in
Korea and Botswana, only reinforces the point: it was not corruption as
such that produced growth, but rather an elite whose policies were
solidified and made credible in corrupt ways. Others practicing similar
corruption might pursue very different agendas. Even when policies are
relatively effective the networks backing them up are less likely to adapt to
changes, crises, or new opportunities than will genuinely open and wellinstitutionalized
systems. Instead, they will more likely protect the status
quo. Corrupt networks can thus help launch positive trends where formal
institutions are too weak to do so, but over time they can ossify, or
gradually be hollowed out if private partners begin to see alternatives to
constantly footing the bill. Eventually such systems, unable to bend, may
well break.
Second, maintaining Elite Cartels is not simple. Italy and Korea underwent
sequential political and economic transitions: Italy democratized
and then developed its economy, while Korea did the reverse. Botswana,
a smaller and more organic society, was able to do both more or less
simultaneously. In all three societies Elite Cartel corruption helped create
makeshift institutions strong enough to manage change. But in Italy and
Korea those alignments are undermined by regional differences, factional
rivalries, and the unenforceability of corrupt deals. Botswana’s elites face
a somewhat simpler situation because of their roots in a smaller, more
homogeneous society, but they have also been more successful in using
political patronage and carefully crafted policies to maintain their base of
support. They have thus avoided both the ‘‘zero-sum’’ style of inter-group
relations noted in Korea and the low levels of social trust and unwieldy
inter-party settlements of Italy. But dealmakers in Elite Cartel systems
have a continuing need for guarantors, face an unknown potential for
internal competitors or external developments to disrupt their bases of
support, and – unlike election losers in a more open and institutionalized
democracy – risk total defeat. Like Elite Cartel politics, the aftermath will
have much to do with which sorts of interests and elites are there to pick
up the pieces.
The countries in this category have weak institutions compared
to Influence Market cases, but strong ones when viewed from the