CORRUPTION Syndromes of Corruption

The international setting 29
development of a polyarchy – the opportunities to signify preferences,
and to have those preferences weighed equally by decisionmakers – are
incompatible with the monopoly influence and lack of accountability that
feature in Klitgaard’s equation. A political monopoly held by an extended
patronage network, or created through electoral fraud, may make it
pointless or risky to express opposition views, while illicit use of discretion
in policymaking means that the preferences of non-favored groups and
citizens will carry little weight. Similarly, genuine freedom to vote, form
independent organizations, and compete for popular support – all parts of
Dahl’s (1971: ch. 1) list of basic democratic guarantees – can be circumvented
by corrupt officials and their private clients. Where civil liberties
are secure, and some political or economic alternatives remain, victims of
corruption may confront the problem directly. But where corrupt networks
dominate politics, citizens will more likely respond in what Alam
(1995) calls evasive ways – dropping out of politics or the mainstream
economy, forgoing economic benefits, or moving away – or in illicit ways,
fighting back with corrupt influence of their own. Such responses may
protect individuals in the short run, but do little to enhance democracy
and nothing to reduce corruption; in the long run they play directly into
the hands of corrupt interests. The belief that corruption is pervasive
appears to encourage tax evasion by citizens (Torgler, 2003; Uslaner,
2003), which in turn weakens government’s capacity to respond to political
mandates and pay adequate salaries. Intangible political costs can be
serious too: a perception of corruption can undermine both the legitimacy
of regimes and leaders and levels of interpersonal trust (Seligson, 2002;
Anderson and Tverdova, 2003).
Because corruption, as a form of influence, requires scarce resources
(money, access, expertise) it typically benefits the ‘‘haves’’ at the expense
of have-nots. Patronage networks may bring large numbers of people into
the political process, but they do so on the terms and in the interests of the
leadership – controlling rather than mobilizing client groups and their
interests. The biggest potential asset of the poor, or of ordinary citizens –
the strength of numbers – can be divided and conquered by giving and
withholding tangible rewards on the basis of politicized discretion
(Wilson, 1960; Webman, 1973; Johnston, 1979). Where playing the
role of political opposition means little more than cutting oneself out of
the spoils, structured political competition may implode into one-party
clientelism or a disorganized scramble over petty stakes. Either way
corruption is a poor substitute for politics. When political change threatens
elites’ security hyper-corruption may result as those unsure of their
hold on power take as much as they can, as quickly as they can take it
(Scott, 1972: ch. 5).