CORRUPTION Syndromes of Corruption

Oligarchs and Clans 149
kickbacks, and protection schemes were common. The PRI exploited not
just private interests but public institutions too, such as NAFINSA,
a national development bank; IMSS, the federal social security institute;
the Secretariat of Land Reform; and the state coffee firm. Booming oil
revenues during the late 1970s made Petroleos Mexicanos (PEMEX), the
state-owned oil company, a ripe target for official theft and contracting
abuses: 85 percent of PEMEX construction contracts were illegally
issued. Leaders of the petroleum workers’ union shared in the no-bid
contracting process, sold jobs, and diverted union dues to their personal
enterprises. During the 1980s the scale of abuses increased, and shifted
toward higher levels; major allegations were made against former
Presidents López Portillo and de la Madrid while PRI resisted inquiries
and attempted to silence critics (Grayson, 1980; Morris, 1991: 48;
Knight, 1996: 227).
When the PRI could not win elections it stole them, as noted. Votebuying,
intimidation, stuffing or ‘‘losing’’ ballot boxes, and false counts
were common; procedures were primitive and, until the 1990s, were
overseen by PRI operatives known as mapaches, or ‘‘raccoons.’’ Polls
might not open at all in some locations; in others they might be moved
at the last minute, with voters left to scurry around like ratones locos, or
‘‘crazy mice,’’ searching for a place to vote. Those lacking specific street
addresses could vote by claiming to be known as a resident of a given area –
a procedure easily abused. Those wanting to vote more than once might
fold several ballot papers together into a taco and put them into the box.
PRI appointees ran the national tally as well, and in a close election such
as 1988 they would do whatever it took to win (Pastor, 2000; Fröhling,
Gallaher, and Jones, 2001; Falken, 2005).
For many years Mexico’s presidents used sizeable personal funds (officially,
erogaciones contingentes) to solidify their positions within both party
and state, as well as for personal benefit. Such funds were an open secret
among top figures, but no accounting was made of their scale or use.
Secret funds came under increasing attack after 1994, particularly by
groups such as Civic Alliance, and by the end of the decade the
Controller General’s office claimed that the practice had all but ended.
An important corrupting influence was brought under control, but
increased political factionalism may also have been encouraged to the
extent that presidential patronage may have been reduced (Morris, 1999:
631, 637; SHCP, 2000).
The shift toward Oligarch and Clan corruption did not start with any
one case, but rather with the gradual unraveling of PRI and its ability to
impose discipline on corruption and other activities. Beginning with the
late-1970s oil boom and continuing into the 1990s corruption increased