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CORRUPTION Syndromes of Corruption

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Influence Markets 69<br />

indicted in 1994 for <strong>of</strong>fenses including embezzlement <strong>of</strong> public and<br />

campaign funds, and served over a year in prison (Morris, 1996). Other<br />

cases have involved bribes passed <strong>of</strong>f as campaign contributions, outsized<br />

honoraria for speeches (now outlawed for Members <strong>of</strong> Congress), gifts to<br />

politicians’ friends, family members, business associates, or even favored<br />

charities, and gifts in kind such as vacations, flights on corporate jets, and<br />

choice seats at sporting events. Private-sector job <strong>of</strong>fers following an<br />

<strong>of</strong>ficial’s departure from government could be the ‘‘back end’’ <strong>of</strong> a quid<br />

pro quo.<br />

It’s good to be an incumbent<br />

Federalism and relatively weak political parties in the US foster freestanding<br />

election campaigns, each responsible for its own organization<br />

and nearly all <strong>of</strong> its funding. Given the cost <strong>of</strong> campaigns and the policy<br />

benefits at stake, and in light <strong>of</strong> the rapid growth <strong>of</strong> s<strong>of</strong>t-money contributions<br />

beginning in the late 1980s, it might seem surprising that<br />

outright bribery is not more common. But donors are not as powerful,<br />

nor are candidates and elected <strong>of</strong>ficials as vulnerable, as is commonly<br />

thought. Money, by itself, usually does not determine election outcomes;<br />

rather, it tends to flow to those, usually incumbents, who are<br />

likely to win anyway. Total spending is generally driven by how much<br />

challengers are able to raise, with incumbents easily outspending them<br />

in response. Contributors (particularly PACs), seeing challengers as<br />

unlikely to win, give them little ‘‘hard money’’ and create a self-fulfilling<br />

prophecy: in 2000, 63 percent <strong>of</strong> all PAC Congressional donations went<br />

to House incumbents, and just 8 percent to their challengers; 14 percent<br />

went to Senate incumbents, and 3 percent to their challengers<br />

(Ornstein, Mann, and Malbin, 2002). Such incumbent advantages<br />

will likely increase under BCRA, which is aimed at creating an allhard-money<br />

system.<br />

Thus the average House incumbent spent $985,461 during the twoyear<br />

2004 electora l cycle ; chall engers spent an avera ge <strong>of</strong> $283,134<br />

(a drop <strong>of</strong> about 25 percent from the 2000 cycle). In the Senate, incumbents<br />

spent an average <strong>of</strong> $6,137,988, and challengers $2,182,732 –<br />

again, down by a quarter from 2000. (Senate spending is less comparable<br />

from one election to the next because states’ populations vary,<br />

and only a third <strong>of</strong> the seats are elected in each cycle.) Measured<br />

against such totals, even the maximum hard-money donation from an<br />

individual ($1,000, at the time <strong>of</strong> the 2000 race) or a PAC ($5,000) is<br />

small change – and most individual and PAC donors contribute less than<br />

the maximum.

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