CORRUPTION Syndromes of Corruption

Oligarchs and Clans 121
Opportunity, risk, and violence
If Elite Cartel corruption is about control, the Oligarchs and Clans
syndrome is about protection. Countries in this group have experienced
rapid and significant liberalization of politics, economies, or both, yet
their institutions and civil societies are very weak. There is much to
contend over, both in the economy and in politics, but risks can be
extreme and there are many unscrupulous competitors. Official powers
and institutions are ineffective, unpredictable, and often up for rent. The
enforceability of contracts and the security of property and investments
are by no means assured; gains often must be protected by further
corruption or violence, and wealth may only be secure when sent out of
the country to safer havens.
Corrupt activities take place at many levels in such situations, but the
most important involve a relatively small number of elites and their
extended personal clans. Poverty, insecurity, and the need for protection
make followers relatively easy to recruit; unpredictable competition and a
climate of uncertainty, however, can make it difficult to reward and retain
them, adding to the incentives to corruption and violence. The state can
lose much of its autonomy, becoming just another source of protection
and of corrupt incentives. Contending clans can extend across business,
state agencies and political parties, law enforcement, the communications
media, and organized crime, at various times conflicting with each
other, colluding, or deepening their domination of economic and political
bailiwicks. Such a situation is hardly promising for either democratic or
economic development.
Oligarch and Clan corruption can be linked to violence. Parliamentarians,
journalists, and jurists opposed to Russian corruption have
been murdered; so have businessmen, party officials, and investigating
journalists in Mexico, and opponents of local election fraud in the
Philippines. Unpredictable contention over large stakes and the weakness
of law enforcement contribute to the violence, but equally important is
the inability of courts and other state institutions to resolve disputes, enforce
contracts, and protect property rights (Varese, 1997: 581–590, 2001;
Humphrey, 2002). Where public agencies cannot maintain such basic
guarantees active markets in ‘‘protection’’ services emerge (Volkov, 2002).
Threats of violence also play a role in disciplining followers who, after
all, have a variety of options. Buying their support repeatedly is very
expensive; using a bit of ‘‘muscle’’ on the unreliable can have valuable
demonstration effects.
Elite Cartel corruption was a source of enough predictability in Italy,
Korea, and Botswana to compensate, at least in some ways, for the