CORRUPTION Syndromes of Corruption

Official Moguls 169
and effective countervailing forces (on popular contention in China see
Perry, 1999). Basic civil liberties and clear, secure property rights would
be major steps; real political competition might give leadership the feedback
and political signals they now suppress (but as we shall see in the
cases of Kenya and Indonesia, too fast a growth in competition might
encourage insecure elites to steal more than ever). Broad-based demands
through a political process might compel party elites to escape the
‘‘involution’’ trap (Lü, 2000) and resolve the conflicting imperatives
(Gong, 1994) that are so debilitating at present.
Such changes are both a utopian ‘‘wish list’’ and utter necessities. China’s
transformation has been based on economic reform, but its current dilemma
is largely political. What is to be done about the hopes and resentments of
hundreds of millions of people who see others profiteering at their expense,
and who have nowhere to turn for redress? We cannot minimize the awesome
challenges involved: for the party, ‘‘letting go’’ would in all likelihood
mean the end, while the state would face huge institutional stress. But while
such a system may shake and sway, if it is politically flexible it might not
break.ThesamecannotbesaidoftheChinesepressurecookertoday.
Kenya: the ‘‘big man’’ and his moguls
During the long rule of Kenya’s President Daniel arap Moi (1978–2002)
corrupt officials had a reach that their counterparts in established market
democracies might only envy. Americans may worry about the future of
their social security system; in Kenya, well-placed political figures simply
stole the National Social Security Fund – twice (Human Rights Watch,
2002: 7–8). One of Moi’s political backers stole the land on which a
flourishing public market had operated for decades (Klopp, 2000).
A citizen seeking redress of such abuses through the courts stood a strong
chance of ending up before a corrupt judge. National commissions of
inquiry compiled significant evidence on major corruption cases, but little
or no action followed. Corruption in Kenya was a smash-and-grab
operation with disastrous effects on development, all based on the
power of a dominant national leader.
Kenya can point to a number of hopeful developments. Competitive
elections have been held since 1992, and brought victory for the opposition,
led by Mwai Kibaki, in December, 2002. International aid and
scrutiny have been extensive, with assistance being withheld and restored
at key junctures based on Kenya’s implementation of political and
administrative reforms. Civil society is active, the press publishes
unfavorable news and critical commentary about the government, and
non-governmental organizations – many of them advocating reform – have