CORRUPTION Syndromes of Corruption

Oligarchs and Clans 153
different systemic corruption problems requiring different reform
responses. Transparency, privatization, streamlining official operations,
and upgraded law enforcement and public management are excellent
reform ideas, but they assume the existence of a state strong enough to
perform basic functions, and lasting political incentives to do so. Absent
that, opening up public processes or rolling back the state will be irrelevant,
as real decisionmaking may already have been ‘‘privatized’’ in
particularly damaging ways: Goldman’s (2003a) term ‘‘piratization’’ has
relevance well beyond Russia. Similarly, urging ‘‘civil society’’ to move
against corruption – in effect, urging the weak to confront the strong –
makes little sense where trust is weak (often for good reasons) and
insecurity is a prime fact of life.
This syndrome – or to be more precise, the corruption along with the
deeper problems that shape its dynamics – has particularly negative
implications for democratic and economic development. It is unpredictable,
feeding on and perpetuating insecurity and a weak state, and is often
linked to violence. It is hard to see any positive agenda being aided by this
sort of corruption, even in derivative ways. Still worse is its tenacity and
capacity to adapt: elites and clans can exploit portions of a society,
economy, or state with little by way of competition or official countermeasures
to stop them, and can respond quickly to new opportunities
or threats.
A final point is that the Oligarchs and Clans syndrome can significantly
broaden the working meaning of ‘‘corruption.’’ At one level this is definitional:
where boundaries and distinctions between the public and the
private, state and society, and politics and markets are indistinct and
fluid, and where legal and social norms are contested or in flux, a wider
range of activities (many murders in Russia, drug transport in Mexico,
corporate takeovers in the Philippines) become a part of the problem.
That fluidity of boundaries, norms, and distinctions intensifies development
problems: the uncertainty of property rights, for example, is a
consequence of corruption and institutional weaknesses, a cause of
further abuses, and a factor deterring investment and sustained broadbased
growth. The Oligarchs and Clans syndrome makes it clearer why
we must think of corruption not as a particular category of behavior but in
terms of systemic problems: the behavior, whether or not it fits formal
definitions, is shaped by deeper problems that impede the open and fair
pursuit of wealth and power, and weaken the institutional frameworks
needed to sustain and restrain those processes.
Are Oligarch and Clan cases lost causes, then? Not necessarily,
although reforms will have little chance of sustained support and success
until deeper causes are addressed in ways that reflect the realities of those