CORRUPTION Syndromes of Corruption

108 Syndromes of Corruption
specific firms, collecting chaebol contributions that came to be known as
‘‘quasi-taxes.’’ Construction firms routinely kicked back between 2 and
10 percent of major contracts’ value. Some of these funds went to Park’s
personal projects, such as the ‘‘New Village Movement’’ which nominally
improved the quality of rural life but in reality was a Park slush fund. The
Blue House – Korea’s presidential residence – became the national clearing
house for political money; during the 1970s as much as 10 billion
won per year passed through its money machine. There is disagreement
over the extent of Park’s self-enrichment; during much of his era he was
portrayed as resisting the temptations of money politics (Cheng and
Chu, 2002: 34). After his assassination about $500,000 was discovered
among Park’s effects (Kang, 2002b: 188), but that sum pales by comparison
to the fortunes amassed by various cronies. A side-attraction of the
Park years was the revelation in the mid-1970s of major sums of political
money spent in the United States by agents such as Park Tongsun
(Moran, 1998: 166–173; Kang, 2002a, 2002b: 185–189; Kim Joongi,
2002: 172–175).
Kim Young-Sam, winner of the first competitive civilian presidential
election, took office in 1993 with reform as a stated priority. Among his
accomplishments was ‘‘real name’’ legislation (1993) requiring that
financial and real-estate assets be held under actual owners’ names. But
the most important development was to investigate ‘‘money politics’’
under predecessor Roh Tae Woo, an inquiry that eventually included
the leaders of the top thirty chaebols as well. Roh had taken in at least $650
million (an average of over $10 million per month), and after leaving
office still had about $245 million in hand. The fund was administered by
Lee Hyun-Woo, a former bodyguard and later a government intelligence
official. The top four chaebol contributors had kicked in between $27
million and $33 million. Nine top business figures were indicted, and five
convicted; Roh himself was convicted and sentenced to jail. Most sentences
were suspended or reduced, but the spectacle of a once-dominant
national leader on trial was a shock. Opposition leader Kim Dae-Jung
(later the first opposition candidate to become President) accepted $2.6
million from Roh, and suspicions extended to, but were denied by, Kim
Young-Sam as well (Park Byeong-Seog, 1995: 172–177; Moran,
1998: 573–574; Blechinger, 2000: 3–4; Steinberg, 2000: 207; Kang,
2002b: 196–197).
Former President Chun Doo Hwan was brought to trial in 1996,
convicted, and condemned to death (a sentence later commuted).
Corruption was not the only issue; charges included his roles in a military
coup in 1979 and the Kwangju massacre of protesting students in 1980.
But Chun practiced ‘‘money politics’’ with particular effectiveness during