CORRUPTION Syndromes of Corruption

106 Syndromes of Corruption
business interests (Cheng and Chu, 2002: 32–33), and a short-lived
alliance of students, newspapers, and opposition groups proved more
than his regime could withstand in 1960. Presidents had to reward and
restrain economic, administrative, and possibly military elites, and control
political competitors. They would also have to attack the pervasive
poverty creating a desperate and unstable social situation. Support from a
strong network of supporting elites and the military was essential, and
constructing that sort of network was not easy.
Bringing power and money together
‘‘Money politics’’ was the usual response to this dilemma, and in this as in
so much else about Korea we must examine the era of Park Chung Hee
(1917–1979). Park’s military career began in the Japanese army during
the colonial years, and he rose to the rank of general in the Korean army
after independence. He was a member of a junta that took power in 1961,
and was elected President in 1963, 1967, and 1971 – the last time, after
amending the Constitution to allow himself a third term. After declaring
martial law in 1972 Park became more brutal; again the Constitution was
amended to ratify and extend his powers. Park was assassinated in 1979
by the head of the Korean Central Intelligence Agency. His governments
were notable for their repressive techniques, but also laid the foundations
for spectacular, chaebol-driven economic growth (Woo, 1991; Woo-
Cumings, 1999a).
Park’s power rested in part on force, but also on money (this discussion
draws upon Moran, 1998: 166–173, and Kang, 2002a). His early dealings
with business seemed adversarial; at one point top business figures
accused of profiteering during the Rhee era were arrested (Woo, 1991:
83–84) and paraded through the streets of Seoul (though promised
punishments were never fully carried out). But Park quickly made
favored businessmen and chaebols junior partners in the regime. In the
early years the balance of power clearly favored Park, who favored
chaebols on the basis of personal loyalty and success in producing growth
(Cheng and Chu, 2002: 33). As Korea’s dash for growth accelerated,
however, the chaebols became integral to a growing alliance between
official power and family/corporate wealth. By the 1980s political
and economic power and interests were virtually unified (Wedeman,
1997a: 470; Steinberg, 2000: 216; Cheng and Chu, 2002: 33–34;
Kang, 2002a: 97ff.).
‘‘Money politics’’ was a powerful combination of political power and
wealth that furthered both interests. It was also rather simple: chaebols
made payments to political leaders, their parties, or their pet ‘‘foundations’’