CORRUPTION Syndromes of Corruption
CORRUPTION Syndromes of Corruption
CORRUPTION Syndromes of Corruption
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172 <strong>Syndromes</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>Corruption</strong><br />
2004). But the new government faces severe problems and resource constraints,<br />
and both Kibaki and a major segment <strong>of</strong> his political backing only<br />
recently split from KANU itself. A decade <strong>of</strong> multiparty elections may<br />
actually have intensified corruption in significant ways, as we shall see.<br />
Helping oneself: corruption with impunity<br />
Monopoly-style corruption by the President and his cronies was not the<br />
only kind <strong>of</strong> corruption to occur in Kenya during the Moi era. So-called<br />
petty corruption took place in everyday encounters; foreign investors and<br />
multinational corporations were involved as well, at times through<br />
bribery and extortion at high levels, and also through preferential access<br />
to resources. But the ability <strong>of</strong> the President and his allies to plunder the<br />
economy was the most significant corruption problem from the standpoint<br />
<strong>of</strong> development and justice. <strong>Corruption</strong> had been common under<br />
Kenyatta, but the Moi years brought a change. Before, major corruption<br />
had generally consisted <strong>of</strong> padding budgets, or <strong>of</strong> percentages paid as<br />
kickbacks and bribes, in connection with legitimate development projects.<br />
As Moi’s regime took hold, however, the projects themselves were<br />
more and more dubious, conceived and funded essentially to benefit the<br />
President and his clients (Ross, 1992: 433).<br />
Both the power to extract corrupt gains and the weakness <strong>of</strong> political<br />
and legal constraints derived from Moi’s dominant position. Numerous<br />
cases were investigated by special commissions but few punishments<br />
resulted, and the resulting reports were generally never published<br />
(Human Rights Watch, 2002: 3–4). In contrast to Influence Market<br />
cases, legitimate business was <strong>of</strong>ten the target <strong>of</strong> corrupt schemes, not<br />
the instigator. There was no doubt who was in charge in Kenya; unlike<br />
Elite Cartel cases, patronage and corrupt elite networks added to Moi’s<br />
backing but his rule did not depend upon them. There were no powerful<br />
oligarchs outside Moi’s circle to plunder the weak state or build economic<br />
bases <strong>of</strong> their own. Instead, Moi and top figures used monopoly power to<br />
enrich themselves, allowed lesser allies to create and exploit smaller<br />
corrupt advantages, and used patronage to keep society politically dependent<br />
and fragmented along tribal lines.<br />
The President and his cronies exploited both politics and the economy.<br />
In the Goldenberg scandal <strong>of</strong> the early 1990s a politically favored businessman<br />
claimed tax breaks on fictitious exports <strong>of</strong> gold and jewels. State<br />
<strong>of</strong>ficials and KANU leaders allegedly shared the spoils. Thanks to their<br />
protection no <strong>of</strong>ficial accounting <strong>of</strong> the losses, or <strong>of</strong> culpability, was made<br />
until late 2003, when a commission <strong>of</strong> inquiry held widely reported public<br />
hearings. Other cases <strong>of</strong> theft from the public sector, <strong>of</strong>ten involving both