CORRUPTION Syndromes of Corruption

From analysis to reform 199
countermeasures (most of them familiar) appropriate to particular societies
and implementing them in the proper sequence, and avoiding
changes that do more harm than good. Implementing ‘‘best practices’’
where institutions are weak and corrupt interests dominate may
accomplish little. Lifting expectations but failing at reform wastes scarce
opportunities and increases the difficulty of subsequent efforts. Longterm
strategy requires careful thought about what is possible, often as
intermediate steps. Building the institutional foundations and political
constituencies reform measures require, enabling societies to withstand
the corruption they experience, and shifting it over time toward less
disruptive varieties are more appropriate goals, and more sustainable in
the long run, than aiming directly at sizeable reductions in corruption.
A developmental ideal
If high-corruption societies should not simply emulate affluent market
democracies or shoot for better scores on indices, what should they aim
for? In chapter 2 I laid out a very general developmental ideal: a system
in which political and economic participation are open, vigorous, and
broadly in balance – in the sense that political actors do not dominate
the economy, and vice versa – and where activity in both spheres is
sustained and restrained by strong state, political, and social institutions.
That ideal helped define our four corruption syndromes, but it
may also be a kind of pole star for reform. Strong institutions and
balanced participation enable societies to respond to corrupt activities
more effectively. They provide non-corrupt economic and political
alternatives for citizens and firms and enable them to defend their
interests. Corruption would scarcely vanish in such a system, but if
our analysis is correct it would occur in less disruptive forms. Further,
to the extent that corruption actually is a consequence and cause of
incomplete liberalization, well-institutionalized, competitive politics
and economies are less likely to be dominated by corrupt elites or
those offering cash to make things happen.
At first glance that ideal may seem just another way of saying developing
societies should emulate affluent market democracies, but it is not:
advanced societies themselves fall short of the ideal, as witness their own
corruption problems. Further, the ideal has several dimensions – institutions
of several sorts and two diverse arenas of participation – making
reform strongly path-dependent. Problems can arise in a number of
different combinations; the journey toward the goal will not run along a
single dimension of less to more development, but will depend greatly
upon a country’s particular array of difficulties. Official Mogul societies,