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CORRUPTION Syndromes of Corruption

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Official Moguls 171<br />

deteriorated into a factional scramble to tap presidential power and<br />

prestige for enrichment and political advantage. By the time <strong>of</strong><br />

Kenyatta’s death in 1978 the nation was governed by a presidential but<br />

largely authoritarian regime (Nyong’o, 1989: 231).<br />

Moi, Kenyatta’s successor, initially released some political prisoners<br />

and presided over a degree <strong>of</strong> political decompression (for early optimism<br />

see Berg-Schlosser, 1982). But he began his move toward one-man rule<br />

and a pervasive national personality cult after a coup attempt in 1982.<br />

Moi’s Kenya African National Union party (KANU) was unopposed<br />

from 1969 through 1992 (Ross, 1992: 425); in 1987 it did away with<br />

secret ballots in parliamentary elections. KANU and Moi’s personal<br />

networks were sustained by a powerful and pervasive system <strong>of</strong> patronage<br />

distributing jobs, administrative decisions, and money (Human Rights<br />

Watch, 2002: 4), <strong>of</strong>ten in such a way as to intensify tribal and ethnic<br />

divisions. Where carrots failed there were always sticks at hand: persistent<br />

critics were subject to repression and violence. In 1990 Foreign Minister<br />

Robert Ouko, a vocal opponent <strong>of</strong> corruption in Moi’s government, was<br />

murdered (Ross, 1992: 434). That crime was eventually traced to some <strong>of</strong><br />

Moi’s personal cronies, and had severe effects upon incoming aid, trade,<br />

and investment (East African Standard, 2003a). International pressure<br />

led Moi to agree in late 1991 to constitutional changes allowing the<br />

existence <strong>of</strong> other parties and competitive elections. But by then, a legacy<br />

<strong>of</strong> one-man rule, thinly veiled by democratic and nationalistic rhetoric,<br />

was firmly in place (Ross, 1992: 440).<br />

The opposition that emerged in 1992 and again in 1997 was divided<br />

among forty or more parties and as many tribal groups (Human Rights<br />

Watch, 2002: 4). Its campaign and candidates were denied full press<br />

coverage, particularly outside the capital city <strong>of</strong> Nairobi. Election procedures,<br />

while reformed somewhat during the 1990s, were still marred by<br />

fraud, vote-buying, and a degree <strong>of</strong> violence, and produced shaky mandates:<br />

Moi’s victory in 1992 for example, came with only 36 percent <strong>of</strong> the<br />

vote in a four-way race (Holmquist, Weaver, and Ford, 1994: 69). The<br />

judiciary was corrupt, intimidated, and demoralized; victims <strong>of</strong> human<br />

rights abuses, illegal land seizures, and corruption have had little success<br />

in seeking legal remedies or compensation.<br />

Under the elections agreement reached in the early 1990s Moi was<br />

obliged to step down after two five-year elected terms, and in December,<br />

2002, Kenya had its most competitive presidential election to date. The<br />

victory <strong>of</strong> Mwai Kibaki, candidate <strong>of</strong> the opposition National Rainbow<br />

Coalition (NARC), over Uhuru Kenyatta – Jomo Kenyatta’s politically<br />

inexperienced son, and Moi’s hand-picked choice as successor – was<br />

decisive, by a margin <strong>of</strong> 63 to 30 percent (World Factbook Online,

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