CORRUPTION Syndromes of Corruption

210 Syndromes of Corruption
attacking them directly – but also with those of officials and citizen groups
lacking the support, security, and at times the muscle needed to confront
corrupt interests directly.
All of the above requires a political leadership that is itself secure.
Political and electoral competition are obviously good things in the long
run, but too much too soon will heighten insecurity. A political foundation
for governing over the longer term, given the personalized nature of
major political forces and weak state of civil society in these countries,
may have to be constructed at the elite level first. Political finance systems
and electoral laws that encourage coalitions and power-sharing among
parties – perhaps even drawing competing factions in under a common
organizational structure, as in the LDP model – are worth consideration.
This is the opposite of our recommendations for Elite Cartel and
Influence Market cases, but here the goal is to help someone get a
foothold sufficient to govern through state and political institutions,
and through political means rather than via bribery and intimidation.
Where institutions and internal anti-corruption forces are weak, outside
influence and assistance – private as well as public – can be crucial.
Businesses making large investments have an interest in training domestic
employees on corruption and business transparency issues, as well as in
learning as much as possible about particular kinds of corruption risks to be
faced. Those businesses themselves must refrain from adding to the corruption.
Enforcement of the OECD anti-bribery treaty within and among
its wealthy signatory countries will be critical to reform in both Oligarch
and Clan and Official Mogul cases. Over the longer term the more successful
countries in the latter categories may ratify the treaty too, which would
involve them in extremely useful peer-review processes regarding anticorruption
policies and enforcement. ‘‘Conditionality’’ – withholding aid
from countries that do not take action against corruption and related
problems – is another option. That idea has many attractions, particularly
if it forces lenders and donors to examine what they have been funding. But
conditionality must be judicious: setting standards too high may persuade
would-be reformers that there is little they can do, and aid cuts that are
massive or too abrupt may only add to insecurity. Better would be to
reward progress toward specific, attainable, institution-building goals.
Conditionality of that sort raises the question of measuring the progress
of reform, an issue to be touched upon below; but for example, donors
might reward demonstrable improvements in tax or customs procedures,
increased speed or a reduced number of steps in the awarding of routine
licenses and permits, or important judicial reforms.
These measures are aimed at building informal elite foundations for
governing; in effect they defer strongly competitive politics, the