CORRUPTION Syndromes of Corruption

Oligarchs and Clans 145
the PRI’s power over two decades and a change in corruption toward a
more open scramble might both reflect deeper trends toward significantly
increasing participation in a setting of weak institutions – defining characteristics
of the Oligarchs and Clans syndrome.
Government of the party, by the party, for the party
The PRI subjected both state and society to its own interests via a
complex mix of incentives and force. Stephen Morris (1991) points out
that a young person hoping to move up in life, a politician or bureaucrat
seeking advancement, or a business person in need of a break had to deal
with the PRI, and on the party’s terms. In some federal agencies ‘‘employees
of confidence’’ – workers appointed by and beholden to PRI patrons –
numbered three-quarters of the workforce (Morris, 1991: 43). Petty
benefits flowed downward and outward through the party and into
society; personal and political loyalties flowed upward, and civil society
and social pluralism were weak. Corruption helped hold politics and a
broader social system together (Knight, 1996), with stability itself being
one of the PRI’s main appeals (Levy and Bruhn, 2001).
Political life in Mexico revolves around the six-year presidential term,
or sexenio; presidents, like all other elected federal officials, are barred
from succeeding themselves. Under the PRI each sexenio followed a
typical rhythm, beginning with grand promises and initiatives, and
often with politically useful revelations of past corruption. After Miguel
de la Madrid left office in 1988, for example, successor Carlos Salinas de
Gortari revealed some of the corruption–narcoviolence connections of
the previous sexenio (Morris, 1995: ch. 3; Jordan, 1999: 152–154). But
corruption-as-usual would return; the fifth or sixth year of a sexenio was
often called el año de Hidalgo (‘‘the year of Hidalgo’’), referring to the face
on the Peso (van Inwegen, 2000), although open venality sometimes
receded as the party set about the business of winning another election.
PRI hegemony lasted from 1929 until 2000, and the party will be a force
once again in 2006, but economic changes beginning in 1982 and political
developments that date from 1988 both revealed the weakness of state
institutions and created vulnerabilities in the dominant party (Fröhling,
Gallaher, and Jones, 2001). In 1982 a global recession, the end of the oil
boom, and a Peso crisis created a severe economic squeeze, derailing once
again Mexico’s hopes of joining the ranks of high-income nations.
Recovery strategies, strongly influenced by the IMF and international
business interests, emphasized liberalization of the economy and upgrading
of state capacity. Both trends shifted considerable power to a growing
class of technocrats (Levy and Bruhn, 2001: 165–177; Tornell, 2002).