CORRUPTION Syndromes of Corruption

12 Syndromes of Corruption
I define corruption as the abuse of public roles or resources for private
benefit, but emphasize that ‘‘abuse,’’ ‘‘public,’’ ‘‘private,’’ and even ‘‘benefit’’
are matters of contention in many societies and of varying degrees of
ambiguity in most. If our goal were to categorize specific actions as
corrupt those complications would be a serious difficulty; indeed they
are reasons for the inconclusive nature of the definitions debate. But at a
systemic level, particularly where the problem is severe, such contention
or ambiguity can be useful indicators of difficulties or change at the level
of participation and institutions. Disputed boundaries between the ‘‘public’’
and the ‘‘private,’’ for example, can signal critical institutional weaknesses.
Where officials flout formal rules with impunity, that may indicate
that countervailing forces in politics or the economy are weak or
excluded. Such systemic issues can be critical to understanding how
contrasting syndromes of corruption might arise and why the contrasts
among them matter.
My primary focus is thus not upon corruption as an attribute of specific
actions, but rather upon systemic corruption problems: uses of and connections
between wealth and power that significantly weaken open, competitive
participation and/or economic and political institutions, or delay or
prevent their development. Systemic corruption problems disrupt the
developmental ideal sketched out in the preceding section in a variety of
ways symptomatic of underlying participation and institutional problems.
Looked at this way corruption is both a symptom of development difficulties
– and thus a useful diagnostic tool for understanding what those
problems are – and a reinforcing cause.
This approach differs from the task of defining a corrupt act in important
ways. Some systemic corruption problems might involve uses of
wealth and power that are legal but still impair institutions and preempt
the participation of others. Indeed, I will argue in chapter 4 that such is
the case in the United States and many other market democracies.
Further, it is meant to accommodate developments central to some of
our syndromes and cases. The boundaries and functions of the ‘‘public’’
domain are changing (as they always have done), and the nation-state’s
dominance is under stress from both above and below – so much so that
in some countries its claims to rule are not convincing. Even where
institutions are strong, more activities and key decisions are taking place
in essentially private arenas through markets, or market-like processes,
subject to less restrictive rules and mechanisms of accountability. Specific
activities might be defined or redefined as corrupt or acceptable in the
course of such changes, but key connections between wealth and power,
and the strength and balance of participation and institutions, might
remain the same – or, be changing in ways that the classification of