CORRUPTION Syndromes of Corruption

Official Moguls 167
hegemony, limits disorderly influences upon policy and development,
and in the view of the leadership allows the country to build a material
basis for eventual change. Some have also argued that liberalizing the
economy but not politics has allowed China to avoid the sorts of disruptive
and violent forms of corruption seen in Russia (Sun, 1999).
But the party’s continued political hegemony may not so much answer
the governability question as avoid it. It has deprived the party of competition
that would encourage needed changes, and of the credibility it
could earn by responding effectively to social problems. It has denied
the state vital feedback on the social consequences of economic transformation.
Citizens and businesses lack legitimate ways to air grievances
and affect the implementation of policies, while the overall system has
been deprived of legitimate flexibility. Looked at that way, Official Mogul
corruption is not just a response to economic incentives but an unofficial
political process too; but because China’s politics do not adapt and bend
as a matter of course, the fear is that at some point the whole system could
break. Absent an outbreak of political activity from unexpected sources,
any sustained push for accountability will have to come from the party
and the state bureaucracy. Neither, however, seems equal to the task, and
Pei (1999: 100) reminds us that Western notions of accountability have
no direct Chinese equivalent.
Prospects for reform: rule by law, political reform, or ...?
Influence Market and Elite Cartel societies often respond to serious outbreaks
of corruption with new legislation or renewed enforcement of laws
on the books. Even Oligarch and Clan societies, whose legal frameworks
have much more serious credibility problems, seek to improve the quality
and enforcement of legislation. In China, however, the most basic notions
of the ‘‘rule of law’’ – that is, of the law as an impersonal set of standards
applied to all in a fair, authoritative, and impartial manner – long played
little role in government. For decades laws were just one part of the
party’s political repertoire, to be defined, applied, and controlled by the
top leadership. The lack of an independent judiciary further politicized
the legal system. Party considerations overrode legislation; laws were
means of political discipline, not popular mandates and certainly not
limits on official powers. Accusing anyone in power of breaking the law
could be both risky and pointless. Enforcement, particularly as regards
abuses by party figures, was spotty, and penalties were small compared to
the gains offered even by middling corrupt deals. As economic reform
gathered momentum, the weak and politicized state of the law made
corruption easier, deepened normative confusion, contributed to the